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NOTE
SELECTED ISSUES IN FEDERAL
CONDEMNATIONS FOR UNDER-
GROUND NATURAL GAS STORAGE
RIGHTS: VALUATION METHODS,
INVERSE CONDEMNATION, AND
TRESPASSt
INTRODUCTION
In December 1989, an arctic cold front lingered over the United
States, setting record low temperatures in 125 cities from the Midwest
to the Eastern United States and as far south as the Gulf Coast.' The
temperature in Houston, Texas fell to a record low of 7'F.2 At the
same time, an explosion and fire stopped production at a large Exxon
refinery in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and frozen equipment shut down
additional production and transportation facilities.3 Just as demand
for natural gas skyrocketed due to the cold, 17% of the country's pro-
duction capability was lost.4 There simply was not enough gas mov-
ing through the pipelines to meet demand. According to one industry
executive, "'[d]uring the freeze, the market fell apart."' 5 Fortunately,
gas distribution companies were able to withdraw enough gas from
t Awarded the fifth annual Case Western Reserve Law Review Outstanding Student Note
Award, as selected by the Volume 50 Editorial Board.
See K. Michael Fraser, Delivering Natural Gas, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Jan. 1991, at
8 (detailing events during winter gas shortage and reaction of markets); Rick Hagar, Winter Hits
U.S. Industry, Strains Gas Supply, OiL & GAS J., Jan. 1, 1990, at 28 (explaining events leading
up to industry-wide gas shortage in middle of winter cold snap).
2 See Fraser, supra note 1, at 8.
3 See Hagar, supra note 1, at 28.
4 See Fraser, supra note 1, at 8.
5 lId (quoting Edward Sondey, a Brooklyn Union Gas Company vice president who is
responsible for gas supply for the utility that serves one million residences in New York City).
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underground storage fields to mitigate the shortages.6 Consequently
most customers experienced no interruption in gas service.7
Again in 1991, a pipeline problem occurred in the Southwest
during a cold snap, resulting in the curtailment of deliveries of gas to
Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation ("Columbia"). 8 During the
interruption, 85% of the deliveries that Columbia made to its custom-
ers consisted of gas withdrawn from underground storage.9 Under-
ground reserves of gas were called upon to meet demand once again
during the unusually cold winter of 1993-94.1°
These events illustrate the importance of underground natural
gas storage to the consumer. Yet many, if not most, people seem to
be unaware of its existence and the important role that it plays in the
nation's natural gas delivery infrastructure. 11
Natural gas is distributed throughout the country, from the wells
that produce the gas to the eventual consumer, via a system made up
in part of over 1.3 million miles of pipeline. 12 In some areas even the
normal flow of gas through transmission pipelines is not sufficient to
meet demand during peak demand times in the winter.13  As illus-
trated above, an interruption of the normal flow of gas through inter-
state pipelines can create a crisis.
To solve this problem, transmission companies and local distri-
bution companies store vast quantities of gas in large underground
storage fields during the spring and summer, when supply exceeds
demand. 14 In the winter or during a crisis, this gas is pumped back
out of storage to supplement the gas coming into the area via pipe-
line.15 In fact, in the winter up to 30% of the daily need for gas can
6 See id.; Hagar, supra note 1, at 28.
7 See Fraser, supra note 1, at 8; Hagar, supra note 1, at 28.8 See David D. Noble, Ten Years of Federal Underground Gas Storage Condemnations,
E. MiN. L. FouND.: PRoc. FOURTEENTH ANN. INST. § 26.05 n.3 (1993). Noble is the attorney
who represented Columbia in many of the cases discussed in this note. Although it is admit-
tedly slanted toward the storage operators' perspective, Noble's article provides useful insights
into the condemnation process as well as otherwise unavailable background information.
9 See id.
so See Warren R. True, Gas Storage Plays Critical Role in Deregulated U.S. Marketplace,
OIL & GAS J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 45 (underscoring "the importance underground natural-gas
storage has come to play in ensuring gas-supply availability").
"1 See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Natural Gas Storage Program (visited Nov. 4, 1999)
<http:/lwww.fe.doe.gov/oil-gas/gasstoragelgas-storage.html> ("Natural gas storage is a vital
link between production and end-use.").
12 See id.
13 See Alan Stamm, Legal Problems in the Underground Storage of Natural Gas, 36 TEX.
L. REV. 161, 162 (1957) (explaining that pipelines large enough to handle peak demand in the
winter would be economically inefficient due to great excess capacity during off-peak times).
14 See U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 11.
15 See id.
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be supplied by withdrawals from storage. 6 This arrangement solves
the winter shortage problem and provides backup in case of an emer-
gency.17  These facilities exist all over the country, indeed, all over
the world,'8 and it was recently estimated that there were hundreds of
underground natural gas storage facilities in the United States alone.19
To facilitate the construction of such projects, gas companies are
permitted to use the federal power of eminent domain to secure the
necessary property rights for approved underground storage areas and
related facilities.20 In brief, under the Natural Gas Act the gas com-
pany must first try to contract with the property owner for the neces-
sary rights, and if unsuccessful may then acquire the rights by filing a
condemnation proceeding in federal or state court.21 This Note will
address some common issues that arise in actions under the Natural
Gas Act to condemn property rights for underground natural gas stor-
age. The issues to be addressed fall into three categories.
One category of issues involves the method of valuation for the
property rights in question. Since the property right being taken for
public use is merely one strand in the bundle of rights making up an
owner's property rights, difficulties in valuation methodology arise.
How exactly does one determine the value of the right to store natural
gas in a geological formation 3,000 feet beneath the surface of one's
property?'
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See, e.g., Southern Uruguay to be Site of Gas Storage Project, OIL & GAS J., July 24,
1995, at 18 (reporting that Michigan company is part of an international group awarded the
contract to develop an underground gas storage facility in southern Uruguay); Australian Un-
derground Storage Facility Open for Business, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 11, 1999, at 6,
available in LEXIS, News Group File (reporting that Western Underground Gas Storage opened
Australia's first underground gas storage facility on Aug. 9, 1999); Western Europe's Largest
Underground Gas Store-Wingas, CHEMICAL Bus. NEwSBASE: PETROLEUM REV., Oct. 20,
1999, available in 1999 WL 28473163 (reporting that Wingas of Germany expanded its Rehden
facility to create the largest underground natural gas storage facility in western Europe); Xu
Yihe, China to Build Underground Gas Storage Facility - Xinhua, Dow JONES ENERGY
SERvICE, Oct. 29, 1999, available in WESTLAW, DYES (reporting that China will build its first
underground natural gas storage field approximately 150 kilometers southwest of Beijing).
19 See Storage/Hubs Seen 'Efficient,' INT'L GAS REP., July 21, 1995, § 280, at 25, avail-
able in LEXIS, RDS Business & Industry Database (examining the role of underground natural
gas storage and market hubs in the natural gas market).
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1994).
21 See id. The Constitution, of course, requires that the property owner be justly compen-
sated for any governmental taking of property. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("jN]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation").
See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement,
962 F.2d 1192, 1194 (6th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter McCullough] (explaining that the underground
natural gas storage field at issue in the case was located "approximately 2800 to 3000 feet be-
neath the earth's surface"). Under FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(c)(1), which deals with federal pro-
ceedings for the condemnation of property, the first defendant listed in the case caption must be
the property itself. As a result, the various condemnation proceedings filed by the same gas
2000]
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Another category of issues concerns the extent of the property
owner's rights to the subsurface geological formations beneath his or
her property. It has been argued that a property owner's subsurface
rights are not absolute but are instead limited in much the same way
as an owner's rights to the airspace above his or her property.23 A
property owner cannot successfully sue an airline for trespass because
one of its airliners flew over the owner's property at great height.24
Does this also mean that a property owner cannot sue a gas company
such as Columbia for trespass for storing natural gas 3,000 feet be-
neath the owner's property without permission?25
The third category of issues concerns whether an owner should
be permitted to sue or counter-sue for trespass when the storage com-
pany has stored gas beneath the property without first obtaining the
necessary property rights either by contract or condemnation. Al-
though procedures for condemning property for use in the interstate
transportation of natural gas are prescribed in the Natural Gas Act,26
they have not always been scrupulously followed.2 7 As a result, the
rights to many properties overlying storage fields have not been se-
cured.28 This is true even though the gas storage fields have been in
operation for decades in some cases.29  The situation is common
enough that the industry even has a name for these properties. They
company have nearly identical and generally indistinguishable names. Courts and commenta-
tors have often adopted the convention of referring to the cases by the last name of the land-
owner involved in the case as a way of distinguishing the cases. See Noble, supra note 8, §
26.01 n.3. This convention is followed throughout this Note.
23 See, e.g., Chance v. BP Chem., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996) (holding that
property owners have subsurface property rights, but that such rights are limited, without spe-
cifically defining the full extent or nature of those limitations).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (holding that the "airspace,
apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain"); Argent v.
United States, 124 F.3d 1277, 1279 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that since Causby, courts
have generally held that "flights above 500 feet in non-congested areas," and flights above
1,000 feet in "congested areas" are in the public domain and not actionable).
2 Compare Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage
Easement, 747 F. Supp. 401, 402-03 (N.D. Ohio 1990) [hereinafter Arnholt] (holding that a
trespass action will not be allowed in an underground natural gas storage condemnation action),
with Bowman v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 1988 WL 68890 (6th Cir. July 6, 1988)
(affirming punitive damages awarded in action for trespass in underground gas storage case with
similar facts).
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1994).
27 In affirming the award of punitive damages for trespass in the court below, the Sixth
Circuit stated that "it is difficult to imagine a case in which an award of punitive damages would
be more appropriate," and went on to characterize Columbia's use of the property without first
obtaining the right to do so as a "willful unauthorized expropriation." Bowman, 1988 WL
68890, at *3.
2 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.04.
29 The storage field at issue in the Bowman case had been in operation for twenty years
prior to commencement of the condemnation action by Columbia, and the company had been
storing gas under the Bowman property without permission or compensation during that time.
See Bowman, 1988 WL 68890, at *3.
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are called "windows" in the gas storage business.
30
When events of some kind precipitate a condemnation action in
these cases, 31 property owners may wish to counterclaim for tres-
pass.32 Are the property owner's subsurface rights sufficient to sup-
port a trespass claim? Does the Natural Gas Act under which the gas
company is entitled to condemn property rights preempt the state law
trespass claim, leaving the owner with only a federal inverse condem-
nation claim for the unauthorized taking? The law of trespass permits
presumed 33 as well as punitive34 damages, whereas inverse condem-
nation permits neither. Considering the immense public importance
of underground natural gas storage facilities, should punitive damages
be allowed? There is a lot at stake for both sides in the resolution of
these issues.
I. BACKGROUND
As America's dependence on natural gas as a fuel source has
grown over the last century,36 so, too, has the dependence of Amer-
ica's natural gas suppliers on underground storage technology.37 The
first underground natural gas storage field began operation in 1915 in
Ontario, Canada.38 The first underground storage field in the United
States was the Zoar field near Buffalo, New York, which commenced
operations in 1916.39  Growth in the number of storage fields pro-
gressed slowly at first, but eventually the number of storage fields
30 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.04.
31 A common event triggering a condemnation action is a plan by the owner to drill an oil
or gas well on his property, threatening the integrity of the underground gas storage field. The
storage company then files a condemnation action to stop the owner from drilling. See, e.g.,
Bowman, 1988 WL 68890, at *1 (beginning with Columbia filing suit to prevent Bowman from
drilling into the storage field); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage
Easement 776 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Parrott] (beginning with Columbia
filing suit to prevent the owner from drilling into the protective zone around the storage field).
32 See, e.g., Arnholt, 747 F. Supp. 401, 402 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (filing of counterclaim by
owners for trespass in condemnation action); Bowman, 1988 WL 68890, at *1 (same).
3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) ("One is subject to liability to
another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected
interest of the other.").
3 See Bowman, 1988 WL 68890, at *3 (Ryan, J., concurring) (explaining that punitive
damages are "permissible in a trespass claim under Ohio law").
31 See idU (explaining that punitive damages "are not available in an inverse condemnation
action under federal law").
3 See Stamm, supra note 13, at 161 (explaining that in 1922, natural gas "supplied only
4.2 per cent [sic] of the country's total energy needs" but that by 1957 gas accounted for more
than 25 percent of those requirements and provided "heat for more residences than.., any other
fuel").
37 See id. (detailing the growth of underground natural gas storage).
38 See id. (citing INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, A SURVEY OF UNDERGROUND
NATURAL GAS STORAGE PROJECTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (1943)).
39 See ida
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blossomed. By 1930 there were still only four U.S. underground
storage fields in operation,40 increasing to fifty in 1944,41 214 in
1956,42 and to 400 fields in operation by 1995. 43
Underground storage fields have now become a crucial link in
the chain that comprises our nation's natural gas delivery infrastruc-
ture,44 and emergency reserves are by no means the only important
function that the storage facilities provide. The Texas legislature
neatly summarized some of the benefits of underground natural gas
storage in the following manner:
The underground storage of natural gas promotes the conser-
vation of natural gas, permits the building of reserves for or-
derly withdrawal in periods of peak demand, makes more
readily available natural gas resources to residential, com-
mercial, and industrial customers ... , provides a better year-
round market to the various gas fields, and promotes the
public interest and welfare .... 4 5
The efficiencies that storage fields bring to the pipelines thein-
selves are another important benefit.46 The immense cost of the inter-
state pipelines that are the major means of transporting gas from the
primary gas producing regions in the Southwest to the main gas con-
suming regions in the Northeast dictate that this resource be used in
the most efficient manner possible. In 1949, the total cost of a 1,500
mile natural-gas pipeline twenty-four inches in diameter was more
than ninety-two million dollars.47 If pipelines adequate to meet peak
demand in the winter heating season were constructed, those pipelines
would cost much more to build and would operate at much less than
full capacity in the summer, resulting in dramatic inefficiency. 48
Underground storage resolves this dilemma by permitting the use
4o See id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 161-62.
43 See Storage/Hubs Seen 'Efficient,' supra note 19. For a state-by-state, county-by-
county table showing details of all U.S. underground natural gas storage fields in operation in
1994, see True, supra note 10, at 47.
44 In a recent petition filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"),
Columbia claimed that its "ability to render adequate and reliable service to a large portion of
the Eastern United States depends in large part on the operation of its underground storage
system." Columbia to Affirm Eminent Domain Rights, GAS STORAGE REP., Aug. 1998, avail-
able in LEXIS.
45 TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.172 (1993).
46 See U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 11 ("Storage enables greater system efficiency by
allowing more level production and transmission flows throughout the year.").
47 See Stamm, supra note 13, at 162 (citing JOSEPH A. KoRNFELD, NATtRAL GAS
ECONOMICS 231 (1949)).
4s See id..
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of smaller pipelines than would be necessary to handle peak de-
mand.49 These pipelines operate at maximum capacity year-round,
with excess stored underground during off-peak times and reserves
withdrawn from storage to satisfy peak demand . 0  One industry re-
port stated that the "[s]torage of natural gas .... both at the producing
and at the consuming ends of the transmission system, has emerged as
shippers' primary means of maintaining flexibility to meet fluctua-
tions in supply and demand."51
A. Technical Basics-How Underground Gas Storage Fields Work
There are several different types of underground natural gas
storage fields, but by far the most common variety is the "depleted
reservoir" type.5 2 These storage fields are located in subsurface geo-
logical formations that have been emptied of the native natural gas
that they contained at one time. The formation consists not of a cav-
ern, but rather of rock that is sufficiently porous and permeable to
allow natural gas under pressure to fill in the spaces in the rock in
much the same way that water soaks into a sponge.53 Porosity refers
to the pores or small spaces in the rock that can store the gas, and
permeability is a measure of the degree to which the pores are inter-
connected by cracks that allow the movement of the gas from pore to
pore throughout the rock.54
Because the porosity and permeability of the rock allows the gas
to migrate freely, the formation would be useless as a storage area
(and would not have held native gas initially), without being sur-
rounded by a barrier of impermeable rock that holds the gas in the
storage field. Without this impermeable barrier, injected storage gas
would be lost forever as it migrated throughout the sub-strata of the
earth. If the integrity of the barrier of an existing storage field is
breached, for example, by drilling, "it could cause the storage field to
49 See U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 11 ("[S]torage decreases the amount of new
transmission pipeline needed to connect the producing regions to the marketplace by 50 per-
cent.").
50 Seei.
51 Tre, supra note 10, at 45. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 11 ("Natural gas
storage is a vital link between production and end-use.").
52 See True, supra note 10, at 46. Storage fields can also be created in salt caverns, un-
derground aquifers, mines, and hard-rock caverns. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 11
(providing general information on underground natural gas storage, including an illustration).
Because most of the storage fields in the United States are of the depleted reservoir type, how-
ever, most of the cases that have arisen in this area have involved depleted reservoir storage
fields (the focus of this Note).
53 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.03.
4 Seek!
55 See id.
20001
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leak,' 56 and render it useless.
A successful underground storage field then, consists of a geo-
logical formation, depleted of its reservoir of native natural gas, made
up of porous and permeable rock, and surrounded by a barrier of im-
permeable rock. These formations can be quite large. In fact, "[an
underground gas storage field is often the size of several town-
ships. 57 Although some above-ground facilities are necessary for the
operation of a storage field, these facilities usually require a very
small percentage of the surface area above a depleted reservoir stor-
age field.
The storage company injects natural gas under pressure into this
geological container. The gas then migrates throughout the forma-
tion, remaining in the underground storage field until withdrawn by
the storage company. The gas that is initially pumped into the storage
field is called "base gas," or "cushion gas,, 58 and serves merely to
raise the pressure in the storage field to the level necessary to conduct
storage operations.59 The base gas remains in the formation until it is
abandoned for storage purposes, 60 and therefore constitutes part of the
investment necessary to construct a storage field.6' The working gas
is the gas that, when added to the storage reservoir, may be with-
drawn at a later date. 62 Working gas is added during the summer
months of low demand and removed to meet higher demand in the
winter.
63
B. The Natural Gas Act of 1938
The federal Natural Gas Act grants private companies engaged
in the interstate transportation of natural gas the right to use the fed-
eral power of eminent domain to obtain property for the construction
of transportation facilities. 64 The statute requires that before availing
56 Id. § 26.04.
57 Id. § 26.03.
-8 See ORIN FLANIGAN, UNDERGROUND GAS STORAGE FAcILmES: DESIGN AND IM-
PLEMENTATION 57 (1995).
59 See id. at 44; Noble, supra note 8, § 26.03.
6o See FLANIGAN, supra note 58, at 44; Noble, supra note 8, § 26.03.
61 See FLANIGAN, supra note 58, at 84 (listing "cushion gas" as one of the necessary in-
vestments in setting up a storage facility, along with factors such as compressors, wells, trans-
mission lines, and dehydrators).
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 The statute provides:
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire
by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to
be paid for, the necessary right-of-way... it may acquire the same by the exercise
of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the dis-
trict in which such property may be located, or in the State courts.
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itself of the powers of eminent domain granted in the Act, the inter-
state pipeline company must show that it is a holder of a "certificate
of public convenience and necessity." 65 This certificate is granted by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") after public
hearings.66  As part of the certification process, a map is issued de-
lineating the geographic boundaries of the project. 67 The first line of
defense for a property owner seeking to attack the validity of a
holder's certificate begins and perhaps ends with the hearing process,
because the statute specifies that a district court does not have juris-
diction to review the decision of FERC to grant the certificate.68  A
person wishing to have the FERC decision reviewed must first peti-
tion FERC for rehearing within 30 days of the granting of the certifi-
cate and must specify the issues to be raised upon rehearing.69 If re-
hearing is denied, the aggrieved person may, within sixty days after
denial of rehearing, petition the court of appeals for review of the
FERC decision.70  The court of appeals, however, generally may not
consider any issues not raised in the petition for rehearing.71 The de-
cision of the court of appeals is "subject to review by the Supreme
Court of the United States."72
The Natural Gas Act does not specifically state that property
may be condemned for underground natural gas storage facilities. In
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1994).
6 I See also 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (1994) ("No natural-gas company... shall...
undertake the construction or extension of any facilities... unless there is in force with respect
to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the
Commission authorizing such acts or operations .... ").
66 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(B) (1994) (requiring that, after application is made for the
certificate, "the Commission shall set the matter for hearing and shall give such reasonable
notice of the hearing thereon to all interested persons as in its judgment may be necessary under
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commission").
67 See generally Noble, supra note 8, § 26.05[l] (discussing the maps that accompany the
certificates of public convenience and necessity and the genesis of the "map rule").
68 See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1994) ("Any party... may obtain a review of such order in
the court of appeals ... by filing in such court, within sixty days after the order of the Commis-
sion upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order of the Commis-
sion be modified or set aside in whole or in part."); Williams Natural Gas Co. v. City of Okla-
homa City, 890 F.2d 255, 262-64 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that "[ji]udicial review under § 19(b)
is exclusive in the courts of appeals once the FERC certificate issues," and that therefore "the
eminent domain authority granted the district courts under § 7(h) of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. §
717f(h), does not provide challengers with an additional forum to attack the substance and va-
lidity of a FERC order").
See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) (1994) ("[A] party may apply for a rehearing within thirty days
after the issuance of such order. The application for rehearing shall set forth specifically the
ground or grounds upon which such application is based.").
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b).
71 See id. ("No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court
unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission in the application for re-
hearing unless there is reasonable ground for failure so to do.").
72 id.
2000]
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a 1947 amendment to the Natural Gas Act, the power of eminent do-
main was granted to interstate pipeline companies, but its application
to condemnation proceedings for underground natural gas storage
rights remained untested for years. 73 It was not until the Parrott con-
demnation case that those rights were firmly established. 74 In that
case the Sixth Circuit held that the language of §717f(h) of the Natu-
ral Gas Act allows legitimate holders of certificates to condemn prop-
erty for underground natural gas storage fields.7 5
The Parrott court carefully applied the Natural Gas Act's grant
of federal eminent domain power to private corporations. Although
the court held that the language of the statute was in fact broad
enough to include the power to condemn property for the under-
ground storage of natural gas,.it found that the Parrott property itself
was outside the map area of the project as delineated by FERC. The
Parrott court held that Columbia therefore could not use its condem-
nation power unless FERC agreed to modify the map boundaries to
include the property.76
The court's reasoning was simple. The Natural Gas Act requires
that, to take advantage of the grant of federal eminent domain powers,
a company must first show that it is a holder of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity.77 The court held that if the property to be
condemned is outside the map area as delineated by FERC, the com-
pany's certificate of public convenience and necessity is not valid
with respect to that property. The company, therefore, does not have
the power to condemn that property unless and until the map is modi-
fied by FERC.78 This has since become known as the "map rule."79
Columbia lost that particular battle but won the war, for the estab-
lishment of the right to condemn was its primary goal.80
In 1988, the Supreme Court, in dicta, cited with approval the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Parrott that the Natural Gas Act language
included the power to condemn property for underground natural gas
storage. 81 The map rule was further refined in the Hostettler and
Johnson cases, in -which it was established that the power to condemn
extended to the "protective area" defined on the map filed with the
73 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.05.
74 See Parrott, 776 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Noble, supra note 8, § 26.05 (ex-
plaining the significance of Parrott).
75 See Parrott, 776 F.2d at 128.
76 See id.
77 See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
78 See Parrott, 776 F.2d at 128.
79 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.05.
80 See id.
', See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293,295 n.1 (1988).
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FERC.82 The protective area refers to the barrier rock that surrounds
the storage field and keeps the gas in place, and without which the
storage field would be useless.83
In summary, in order to use the power of eminent domain
granted in the Natural Gas Act, the company seeking to condemn
property must show:
1. It is a natural gas company regulated by FERC pursuant
to the Natural Gas Act;
2. It holds a valid certificate of public convenience and
necessity from FERC for the storage field where condemna-
tion is sought;
3. The easement sought is in the certificated geologic for-
mation; and
4. The affected real property is within the "map area" of
the storage field defined by the certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity.84
Once these elements have been demonstrated, the ability of the com-
pany to condemn the property rights sought is established and the is-
sue becomes one of putting the proper valuation on those rights.
Valuation methodology will be discussed at length, but first an expla-
nation of the origin of the cases that present these issues is in order.
C. How the Condemnation Issue Arises
There are several ways in which a case involving one or more of
the issues addressed in this note may arise. The'textbook application
of the Natural Gas Act would begin with the company obtaining a
certificate of public convenience and necessity from FERC.85 After
obtaining the certificate, the company would then approach every
property owner and attempt to privately contract for the right to store
82 See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement,
688 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Ohio 1988) [hereinafter Hostettler]; Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.
v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 705 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Ohio 1988) [hereinafter John-
son].
8 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.05.
84 Id. § 26.06.
' See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (1994). See also supra notes 65-72 and accompanying
2000]
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gas beneath the property, as well as any surface rights needed.8 6
Historically, most property owners voluntarily agree to relinquish the
needed rights.8 7 If the company is unable to contract with some of the
owners, then it files a condemnation action in state or federal court.88
After demonstrating the elements required as a prerequisite to
exercising the power of eminent domain under the Natural Gas Act,
the issue is then one of valuation. 89 In this hypothetical example,
trespass would not be an issue because the company is securing the
necessary property rights prior to using them. Of course, there are
several potential fact patterns in which trespass is an issue, and these
cases arise when a company has an ongoing underground gas storage
operation but has failed for one reason or another to obtain all of the
necessary property rights. A property overlying an underground gas
storage field for which the property rights have not been obtained is
called a "window" in the storage field.90 When the owner of a win-
dow property threatens to drill into the storage field or surrounding
barrier rock, the company may file a condemnation action to prevent
that owner from either producing the company's storage gas or dam-
aging the integrity of the entire storage field.91 In response, the owner
may counterclaim for trespass.92 In some cases the property owner
initiates the lawsuit rather than the storage operator, by suing the op-
erator for trespass. The operator then files a condemnation action in
response and claims that the federal condemnation action preempts
the state trespass claim.
93
In addition to potential claims for trespass, these cases involve
questions about valuation methodology just as in the "textbook" hy-
pothetical example above. In fact, although it did not involve a claim
for trespass, the McCullough case, the case that has so far yielded the
most detailed analysis of valuation methodology, arose when the
86 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.04 (discussing methods of acquiring the property rights
necessary to operate a storage field, and the fact that "[s]torage operators always try to obtain
storage rights to all the properties in a storage field").
b7 See id. (explaining that "[m]ost landowners voluntarily lease necessary underground
storage rights to the storage operator").
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1994).
89 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.06[1].
90 See id. § 26.04.
91 See id. § 26.05. The Parrott case arose when the property owner began implementing a
plan to drill into the storage reservoir. See Parrott, 776 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1985). See also
Bowman v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 1988 WL 68890, at *1 (6th Cir. July 6, 1988)
(arising when window property owner applied for permit to drill well).
92 See, e.g., Amholt, 747 F. Supp. 401, 402 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (discussing property owner
filing counterclaim for trespass).
%c See, e.g., Bowman, 1988 WL 68890, at *1 (affirming the district court's decision al-
lowing a property owner to sue a storage operator for trespass).
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owners planned to drill into the storage field.94
Some type of accident or malfunction in the storage field that in-
volves a window property may also give rise to a condemnation ac-
tion.95 It is also possible for inaccuracies in the estimation of the size
of the storage field to be the genesis of these issues. For example, the
reason that the Parrott property was not within the map area origi-
nally submitted to FERC was that the storage field turned out to be
larger than Columbia's engineers had estimated.96 This was a result
of one of the difficult aspects of developing and managing an under-
ground natural gas storage field-namely that it is impossible to di-
rectly observe the geological formation thousands of feet below the
earth.97 The maps initially submitted to FERC are based on estimates
of the dimensions of the storage field, but gas is sometimes very slow
to migrate throughout the extent of the field,98 and companies some-
times discover that the boundaries of a storage field are not where
they first expected.9 9 In this way, a property that the company origi-
nally expected to be outside the storage field, and therefore one for
which the company did not acquire the property rights, can become a
window in the storage field, with all the attendant problems that ac-
company such parcels.
Thus, there are numerous ways for an action for condemnation
of underground natural gas storage rights to arise. The issue common
to all such cases, however, is valuation.
D. Valuation Methodology
The problem is easy to frame and difficult to answer: how ex-
actly does one determine the value of the right to store natural gas
thousands of feet beneath the surface of one's property? The Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides scant guidance. It sim-
ply states that private property shall not be taken "without just com-
94 See McCullough, 962 F.2d 1192, 1194 (6th Cir. 1992).
95 A recent case in the Northern District of Ohio came about when gas from an under-
ground storage field leaked through an abandoned well into a fresh water aquifer and came out a
neighbor's faucet. The leaking well turned out to be on a window property, and to obtain access
to repair the well, Columbia filed a condemnation action. The property owners filed a counter-
claim for trespass because Columbia's underground gas storage field beneath their property had
been in operation since the early 1950s without Columbia having secured the necessary property
rights. See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, Case No.
1:98CV 590 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 1999) [hereinafter Amend]. This case was settled prior to trial
or other disposition.
96 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.05[1].
97 See id § 26.03.
98 Seei.
99 See &L § 26.05[1].
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pensation. ' 1°°
Two factors make solving this problem particularly difficult.
First, the right at issue is not a commonly bargained-for right. This
means that the average person (average juror, average lawyer, or av-
erage judge) lacks any idea of what the right might realistically be
worth. It also means that there is a notable lack (and perhaps a com-
plete absence) of comparable arm's length sales that one might look
to for an idea of value.
Second, the right at issue is not a particularly valuable right. In
these cases subsurface rights are typically the only rights being con-
demned. The surface use of the property is normally unaffected. In
1993 it was reported that Columbia routinely paid four dollars per
acre per year for the right to store gas beneath a property, while East
Ohio Gas was paying the sum of five dollars per acre per year.10 1 The
small amount of value or minimal amount of intrusion on the property
owner's rights at issue is not determinative of the matter, however.
To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that "constitutional pro-
tection for the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on
the size of the area permanently occupied."' l
The most detailed analysis of the problem so far has come in an
Ohio case involving Columbia and a property owner named McCul-
lough. 103 This case seems to have settled the law with regard to this
issue in Ohio, and, to a lesser degree, in the Sixth Circuit. It is not yet
apparent what effect these decisions will have for condemnations in
other states. Nevertheless, the McCullough case provides a good il-
lustration of a judicial system working through this problem. The
courts involved used a carefully reasoned, thoughtful approach to the
problem, resulting in some rules and analysis that can provide illumi-
nation and direction on this issue to courts in other jurisdictions.
In the McCullough case, Columbia filed suit in district court to
condemn an easement for the underground storage of natural gas in its
Wayne Storage Field, approximately 2,800 to 3,000 feet beneath the
surface of the McCullough property.Y°4 Rather than try the case to a
jury, the judge, complying with the wishes of both parties,105 ap-
pointed a commission to determine the appropriate compensation to
10o U.S. CONST. amend. V.
101 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.04 n.l.
1o2 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,436-37 (1982).
103 See McCullough, 962 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1992). For further background information,
provided by the attorney who represented Columbia in this case, see Noble, supra note 8, §
26.11[6].
14 See McCullough, 962 F.2d at 1194.
105 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.11[6].
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be paid to the landowners.1 6 The court provided the commissioners
with detailed instructions as to the methodology for determining value
and awarded the landowners $213,798 in compensation. 0 7
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the judge's instructions to
the commissioners were improper because they failed to follow Ohio
state law in determining just compensation and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 0 8 In its decision, the court of appeals provided a
detailed analysis of whether state or federal law should govern the
determination of value in such condemnation cases and ultimately
offered a number of factors supporting its decision that state law
should control, including the fact that property rights are traditionally
an area largely defined by state rather than federal law."°9 The
McCullough court also cited the lack of a compelling reason to fash-
ion "a nationally uniform rule of compensation for private parties ex-
ercising their power of eminent domain under the Natural Gas Act,"
and its confidence that "incorporating state law as the federal standard
[would] not frustrate the specific objectives of the Natural Gas
Act."" 0 The court concluded that, "although condemnation under the
Natural Gas Act is a matter of federal law, § 717f(h) incorporates the
law of the state in which the condemned property is located in deter-
mining the amount of compensation due.""'
Upon remand, the district court certified the following question
to the Ohio Supreme Court: "According to the law of the state of
Ohio, what is the measure of just compensation for the appropriation
of an underground gas storage easement?"'" 2 In response, the Ohio
Supreme Court adopted the federal judge's instructions to the com-
mission." 3 In fact, all but three paragraphs of the Ohio opinion sim-
ply reprinted the instructions originally provided by the district court
to the commission, which delineated the various factors to be used in
106 FED. R. Crv. P. 71A(h) governs federal condemnation proceedings under the power of
eminent domain. This rule provides that, unless specifically provided for otherwise in the
authorizing statute, any party may have a jury trial on the issue of just compensation by so re-
questing, "unless the court in its discretion orders that, because of the character, location, or
quantity of the property to be condemned, or for other reasons in the interest of justice, the issue
of compensation shall be determined by a commission of three persons appointed by it." l
The judge used his discretion to appoint a commission in the McCullough case, but clearly this
rule would support a decision to allow a jury to decide the issue of compensation. In fact, the
comments to Rule 71A make clear that the preferred method of determining value in such a case
is trial by jury. See FED. R. Civ. P. 71A advisory committee's notes.
07 See McCullough, 962 F.2d at 1194-95.
'o See id. at 1200.
"9 See id. at 1198.
11o Id. at 1198-99.
.. Id at 1199.
112 Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement, 67
Ohio St. 3d 463, 463 (1993) [hereinafter McCullough I1].
113 %Pe id
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determining value.' 14
After the Ohio Supreme Court held that the original instructions
to the commission were to be adopted as Ohio law, the district court
reinstated the commission's award of $213,798 as just compensation
without further proceedings, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.'
15
In sum, the Sixth Circuit held that in condemning an easement
for underground natural gas storage, state law shall be applied in de-
termining just compensation for the taking of the easement. The Ohio
Supreme Court, following the district court's lead, carefully pre-
scribed the precise methodology to be used in making that determina-
tion in Ohio. A jury or commission following these instructions
could use one or more of the factors adopted by the Ohio Supreme
Court to determine value, even though some of these factors may not
be applicable in every case.
In the McCullough case, for instance, the award was based on
apparently credible testimony that significant economically recover-
able reserves of native oil and natural gas existed beneath the prop-
erty, from which the Columbia easement would prevent the McCul-
loughs from profiting.1 16 The existence of such reserves was enumer-
ated by the Ohio Supreme Court as one of the factors that may be
used in determining value." 7 In some cases, however, it may be ap-
parent that all reserves of oil and natural gas beneath the property
have been exhausted, so it would be inappropriate for a jury to con-
sider this factor in determining value. The existence of current min-
eral leases is another factor to be considered that will likely not be
applicable in all cases.
The end result is that in Ohio, both federal and state law are clear
with regard to the valuation methodology for underground natural gas
storage condemnation cases. In Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee,
it remains clear that the law in the Sixth Circuit is that state law is
followed in establishing valuation methodology, but it is perhaps less
clear what the state law is on this point. Outside the Sixth Circuit the
issue is much more open, and a major question that will be examined
further in this Note is whether the thoughtful reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit and the Ohio Supreme Court should be followed by other cir-
cuits and other states.
114 See id. at 463-65.
15 See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement,
1995 WL 216915, at *I (6th Cir. Apr. 11, 1995).
116 See McCullough, 962 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (6th Cir. 1992).
17 See McCullough II, 67 Ohio St. 3d at 464.
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E. Inverse Condemnation and Trespass
Another important question that has arisen in some condemna-
tion actions is whether the property owner may sue or counter-sue for
trespass.1 18 This is an issue in cases where the underground gas stor-
age field has been in operation for some period of time and the stor-
age field operator has never obtained the necessary property rights,
either by contract or condemnation. 19 It has been argued in such
cases that state law trespass claims by the property owner are pre-
empted by the federal law that authorizes the use of eminent domain
power by holders of certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity.120 This argument concludes with the assertion that the property
owner's sole remedy is a federal inverse condemnation claim. 121 The
law on this point is not settled, 2 so the argument has been made in
the alternative that, even if the trespass claim is not held to be pre-
empted, the conduct of the storage operator does not constitute tres-
pass.i
To understand the analysis of these issues, it is helpful to have a
basic grasp of the fundamentals of both trespass and inverse condem-
nation as applied to this type of situation. The law on the issue of
underground trespass is fairly straightforward-an actor may be liable
for trespass due to an intrusion beneath the surface of another's
land.124 Of course, in underground natural gas storage cases, the tres-
115 See, e.g., Arnholt, 747 F. Supp. 401, 402-03 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (discussing a counter-
claim for trespass by the property owner after Columbia filed suit for condemnation under the
Natural Gas Act).
'" See id. at 402.
'20 See id at 403.
121 See id.
12 Compare Bowman v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 1998 WL 68890, at *1 (6th
Cir. July 6, 1988) (explaining that the district court judge below permitted property owner's
action for trespass rather than inverse condemnation in underground gas storage condemnation
case), with Arnholt, 747 F. Supp. at 403 (holding that inverse condemnation rather than trespass
applies in an underground natural gas storage condemnation action virtually identical to Bow-
man).
'2 See Bowman, 1988 WL 68890, at *2 ("Columbia argues that (1) Bowman is limited to a
cause of action for inverse condemnation under the fifth amendment, and may not assert a claim
for trespass under Ohio law; and (2) the act alleged did not constitute a trespass under Ohio
law.").
124 See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965) ("[A] trespass may be committed
on, beneath, or above the surface of the earth."). See also Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 10 N.E.2d
917, 923 (Ind. 1937) (holding that "appellant pretended to use the 'Marengo Cave' as his prop-
erty and all the time he was committing a trespass upon appellee's land"); Edwards v. Sims, 24
S.W.2d 619, 621 (Ky. 1930) (deciding whether to require a survey to establish extent of cave's
boundaries, the court reasoned that "[i]f the survey shows the Great Onyx Cave extends under
the lands of plaintiffs, defendants should be glad to know this fact and should be just as glad to
cease trespassing upon plaintiff's lands"); Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 937 P.2d 979, 983 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1997) ("[I]n New Mexico an action for trespass does provide relief for trespass beneath the
surface of the land.").
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pass is committed not by a person, but by an instrumentality con-
trolled by a person. The law of trespass, however, is again clear-an
actor may be held liable for trespassing on the land of another be-
cause of the continued presence of "a structure, chattel, or other thing
the actor has tortiously placed there."'l It is established, then, that an
action may lie for underground trespass caused by an instrumentality
under the control of another.
126
The law of inverse condemnation is also relatively straightfor-
ward. The United States government has four basic methods by
which it may take a piece of private property for public use.127 The
most commonly used method is a straight condemnation proceeding
in which the government takes the property by power of eminent do-
main.128 As a part of the proceeding, the compensation to be paid to
the landowner is determined, the owner is paid, and the title then
transfers to the United States.1 29 In this scenario the United States
does not take possession of the property prior to taking title. 130
A more expeditious method for taking property is provided by
the Declaration of Takings Act. 131 The Act provides a procedure
whereby the government may, any time prior to the judgment in a
condemnation action, file a declaration of taking with the court and
then take immediate title and possession of the property. 32 Before
taking title and possession, the Act also requires that the government
deposit with the court "an amount of money equal to the estimated
value of the land," which is to be promptly distributed to the owner.133
The court proceedings continue with the goal of establishing value,
and if the value eventually established is higher than the estimate paid
previously, the owner receives the difference plus interest.
134
A third available method is for Congress to directly exercise the
power of eminent domain in what is termed a legislative taking.
35
Under this method, Congress simply passes a statute that vests title of
a property in the United States immediately upon enactment and pro-
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 (1965).
126 See, e.g., Chance v. BP Chem., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996) (holding that a
property owner could prevail on a trespass claim involving deepwell injection under his prop-
erty).
127 See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3-6 (1984) (reviewing the
various methods by which the United States government may exercise the power of eminent
domain).
'28 See id. at 3.
129 See id. at 4.
1s See id.
'1 40 U.S.C. §258a (1994).
132 See id.
133 Kirby Forest lndus., 467 U.S. at 4-5.
134 See 40 U.S.C. §258a.
13- See Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 5.
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vides for the subsequent determination of just compensation to be
paid to the land owner.
136
Finally, the government may simply take physical possession of
a property, ousting the owner, without any formal condemnation pro-
ceedings.137 The owner then has the right to sue the government for
"inverse condemnation" to obtain compensation as of the date of the
taking. 138 A condemnation proceeding normally involves a condem-
nor filing suit against an owner to take property for public use. 39 Oc-
casionally, however, the government takes property without any for-
mal proceedings and without paying the owner. 4 In those cases, the
owner may sue the government, claiming that there has in fact been a
taking of his property without compensation and seeking damages for
that taking,141 hence the term "inverse' condemnation. 142  Just com-
pensation is then paid to the property owner as a result of that pro-
ceeding. 143 Actions for inverse condemnation have been allowed in
cases of regulatory 144 as well as physical 45 takings, and for both di-
rect' 46 and indirect' 47 takings.
Taking land by physical appropriation is an officially disfavored
method.14 8  The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
13 See id. For example, the land for Redwood National Park was taken in this manner.
See id. at5 n.5.
'3 See id. at 5.
138 See id. See also United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (explaining the
difference between "inverse condemnation" and "condemnation" actions).
139 See Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257.
140 See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing a
plaintiff who sued for inverse condemnation because the EPA placed ground water wells and
equipment on plaintiff's property without permission or compensation).
141 See id.
142 See Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257 (defining inverse condemnation).
143 See i (explaining that inverse condemnation is "a shorthand description of the manner
in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemna-
tion proceedings have not been instituted").
144 See, e.g., First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987)
(holding that a county land-use regulation that denied plaintiff all use of his property constituted
a compensable taking).
145 See, e.g., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 (explaining that when
a government, without formal condemnation proceedings, physically takes property, "the owner
has a right to bring an 'inverse condemnation' suit to recover the value of the land on the date of
the intrusion by the Government").
146 See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (drilling of
groundwater wells on property without permission).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946) (holding that the govern-
ment partially "took" property as a result of regular flights by airplanes as low as 83 feet over
the surface of the property, even though the planes never physically touched the surface of the
property); Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that owner's
inverse condemnation claim is not precluded because noisy aircraft operated by Navy flew over
adjacent parcels and not over owner's parcel).
14' See Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 5-6.
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Acquisition Policies Act of 197014' dictates that federal agencies try
to acquire land through negotiations instead of condemnation pro-
ceedings, and "whenever possible not to take land by physical appro-
pfiation.'15°
In an inverse condemnation action the plaintiff is permitted to
recover damages for an uncompensated taking of his property, but the
doctrine does not provide for punitive damages.15' This distinction
between inverse condemnation and trespass has public policy ramifi-
cations and provides the storage operator with strong motivation to
argue in favor of federal preemption of the state law trespass claim.
152
For the same reason, the property owner will prefer an action for tres-
pass over an inverse condemnation claim. Without this distinction
regarding punitive damages it appears that the debate as to whether
the property owner's remedy is to be found in a trespass or an inverse
condemnation action would be largely one of academic rather than
practical effect.
I. ANALYSIS
The development of the law to date regarding condemnations for
underground natural gas storage rights has left several legal issues
unresolved. Depending on the state in which the action arises, there
may be a significant question as to the method of valuing the property
rights to be taken. There is also some question as to whether a state
law action for trespass may be allowed, or if such an action is pre-
empted by federal law, leaving the plaintiff with an inverse condem-
nation remedy. Further, should a trespass claim be permitted, there
may be some question as to whether the unauthorized storage of natu-
ral gas thousands of feet beneath a property constitutes trespass.
Even with the sometimes conflicting authorities that exist on
these questions, it is possible to choose a clear path through the maze.
Each of these unresolved issues will be examined in this section.
A. Valuation Methodology
The first major piece of the puzzle to be examined is valuation
methodology. In essence, the questions to be answered are whether
149 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1994).
'5o Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 4651(8) (1994) ("No Federal
agency concerned shall intentionally make it necessary for an owner to institute legal proceed-
ings to prove the fact of the taking of his real property.").
151 See Bowman v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 1988 WL 68890, at *3 (6th Cir.
July 6, 1988) (Ryan, J., concurring) ("[P]unitive damages, permissible in a trespass claim under
Ohio law, are not available in an inverse condemnation action under federal law.").
152 See id.
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the State of Ohio and the Sixth Circuit "got it right" in the McCul-
lough case,153 and whether their example should be followed in other
states and circuits around the country.
Initially, the focus here will be on whether the valuation meth-
odology arrived at in McCullough154 is worthy of emulation else-
where, but another important question to be addressed is whether the
valuation methodology to be used should be a matter of state or fed-
eral common law. Because a resolution of this question necessarily
involves some issues that overlap with the consideration of whether a
state law trespass claim should be allowed when the facts warrant it,
these issues will be discussed together below.
The overall problem to be resolved in this section can be very
succinctly summarized. The U.S. Constitution makes clear that prop-
erty is not to be taken for public use without the payment of "just
compensation" to the owner.55 Both sides in a condemnation action
will likely agree on this point. If the action involved the taking of an
entire piece of property-including all surface, mineral, and air
rights-valuation of the property would be more easily accomplished.
There is an established market for entire properties, in which buyers
and sellers routinely engage in arm's length transactions. These
transactions can be analyzed to arrive at the market value for the
subject property. When one is dealing with a taking of underground
natural gas storage rights, however, the commodity is one for which
there is no established market in which similar property is routinely
traded at arm's length. 156 This makes valuation problematic, and the
question is just what standard should be used to value such an infre-
quently valued right? It has been argued that the standard is supplied
by the U.S. Constitution itself, which requires the payment of just
compensation.15 7 But to offer "just" compensation as the standard is
153 See McCullough, 962 F.2d 1192, 1199 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the federal Natural
Gas Act "incorporates the law of the state in which the condemned property is located in deter-
mining the amount of compensation due"); McCullough II, 67 Ohio St. 3d 463, 464-65 (1993)
(promulgating the factors to be considered in Ohio when establishing a value for the right to
store natural gas in the geological sub-stratum beneath a property).
54 See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
155 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'm It is true that there is a market to look to for some indication of value. Many property
owners voluntarily grant underground storage rights to storage operators in exchange for the
"going rate" routinely paid to landowners by that particular storage operator. However, it is also
clear that in most cases, this is not an arm's length transaction. The offer is generally accompa-
nied by the explicit or implicit threat that if the owner does not agree the company will simply
take the rights by eminent domain, and there are no other buyers willing or able to purchase the
same rights from the landowner. Essentially, there is no market in the usual sense.
157 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.11[6] ('IT]he Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution specifies the measure of compensation for all federal appropriations-it must be
'just.").
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simply to beg the question of exactly how one determines "just" com-
pensation in such a case.
This is precisely the issue that the courts wrestled with in the
McCullough case.158 The solution to the valuation problem that the
courts involved in that case eventually produced was a list of factors
and some general principles to be considered by a commission or jury
when establishing value in an underground natural gas storage con-
demnation case. These factors will be considered as a possible model
for actions in other jurisdictions.
The instructions adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court 159 begin
with a brief introductory paragraph that sets a general framework for
the process of establishing value:
In determining just compensation for the easement, you shall
consider fair market value. The fair market value is the fair
and reasonable amount which could be attained in the open
market at a voluntary sale. In this case, there are alternative
methods of determining fair market value based upon your
preliminary determinations, including whether there exists
native natural gas in the Clinton formation under the con-
demned tract to the extent that its recovery would be eco-
nomically justified.t 60
There is nothing remarkable in the direction to consider fair market
value, or the definition of fair market value as "the fair and reasonable
amount which could be attained in the open market at a voluntary
sale."'161 Fair market value is the traditional standard for determining
just compensation,162 and the definition of the term given is tradi-tional, as well. 63 The remainder of the paragraph simply states that
158 See supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
' See McCullough II, 67 Ohio St. 3d 463,463 (1993). These instructions were originally
developed by the federal district court and provided to the commissioners when the case was at
the trial level. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit struck down the award and remanded for further
proceedings because the instructions failed to take into consideration relevant state law. On
remand, the district court certified the following question to the Ohio Supreme Court: "Accord-
ing to the law of the state of Ohio, what is the measure of just compensation for the appropria-
tion of an underground gas storage easement?" Id. In response, the Ohio Supreme Court
adopted the instructions originally provided to the commissioners. See id. The balance of the
opinion simply quotes the trial court's instructions.
16o Id.
161 Id.
162 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) ("Market value fairly deter-
mined is the normal measure of the recovery."); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374
(1943) (explaining the adoption of "market value" as a standard for determining just compensa-
tion).
163 Although the impact is the same, the Court put a slightly different spin on the definition
in Miller, in stating that the owner is entitled to "what it fairly may be believed that a purchaser
in fair market conditions would have given." Miller, 317 U.S. at 374.
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alternative methods of valuation will be provided to the factfinder,
and then offers as an example one of the more controversial of those
factors, discussed in detail shortly. These concepts are well supported
by authority, including the concept of alternative methods for estab-
lishing value.
64
The first alternative method enumerated by the court was:
1. Comparable Sales. One method in determining fair mar-
ket value would be to consider comparable sales of ease-
ments for the purpose of allowing the storage of natural gas
in the Clinton formation. If no evidence is offered of such
comparable sales, this method is not available to assist you in
determining just compensation. 65
Again, this is a traditional approach to the problem.166  Generally
speaking, analyzing recent comparable sales is one of the best ways to
establish the fair market value of a property.167 It seems that many, if
not most, property owners voluntarily agree to surrender the neces-
sary property rights in exchange for payment of a standard fee set by
the storage operator.168 As mentioned previously, in 1993 it was re-
ported that Columbia routinely paid four dollars per acre per year for
the right to store gas beneath a property, with East Ohio Gas paying
five dollars per acre per year. 169 These transactions should be consid-
ered as some evidence of value. There are, however, some difficul-
ties with using these sales as a benchmark.
First, and most obvious, these transactions are not actually sales
at all, but rentals. If the factfinder is attempting to arrive at a fair
market rental price, then these transactions might be comparable. If,
however, the factf'mder is trying to arrive at a fair market value for a
lump sum payment in return for the transfer of a permanent easement,
then the rental transaction must be converted into a present value for
purposes of comparison. This was anticipated by the court and is ad-
t6 See Miller, 317 U.S. at 373-74 (explaining that it "is conceivable that an owner's [com-
pensation] should be measured in various ways depending upon the circumstances of each
case").
165 McCullough I, 67 Ohio St. 3d 463,464 (1993).
166 See EDWIN M. RAMS, VALUATION FOR EMINENT DOMAIN 153 (1973) ("The second
step of valuation then involves a search and examination of the market for similar market sales,
with similar physical attributes and rights, to obtain an insight as to the probable value of a
subject property.").
167 See i.
163 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.04 ("Most landowners voluntarily lease necessary under-
ground storage rights to the storage operator. It is not often that landowners are offered money
for rights that they do not use, to authorize an operation that causes them no inconvenience
whatsoever.").
169 See id. § 26.04 n.1.
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dressed in the third alternative method for establishing value, which
will be discussed below. Of course, if the company has made lump
sum payments in exchange for permanent easements, no conversion is
necessary if those figures are available. Columbia, for example, has
recently paid lum0p sum payments of fifty dollars per acre for perma-
nent easements.
A much more troubling question with regard to the use of either
rental or lump sum payments paid by the storage operator is whether
the payments in fact represent fair market value. A very strong argu-
ment can be made that, at least in the traditional sense, they do not. It
is undisputed that in this situation, there is essentially no market, and
therefore these sales fail to indicate "the fair and reasonable amount
which could be attained in the open market at a voluntary sale. '" 171 In
a brief filed in a recent condemnation case in the Northern District of
Ohio, attorneys for Columbia argued that:
Columbia is the only market for these rights. Defendants
cannot establish that their rights are worth more than Colum-
bia pays because no one else would buy them. Therefore, the
total just compensation to which the Defendants are entitled
is $50.00 per acre. 172
Although this case settled prior to trial,173 Columbia appears to be
making a self-defeating argument. To the extent that they succeed in
establishing that there are no other buyers for the subject property
rights, and hence no other comparable sales to look to for guidance,
they would seem also to succeed in establishing that such payments
do not represent "the fair and reasonable amount which could be at-
tained in the open market at a voluntary sale." 174 To the contrary,
when the supply of a good remains constant, price will increase as
demand increases. Applying that rule to this case, if the same prop-
erty right were to be sold in an open market with multiple competing
buyers, instead of with Columbia as the sole buyer, one could rea-
sonably expect that the price would be higher than what Columbia has
traditionally paid. Since a competitive market is the standard for es-
tablishing value, rather than a monopolistic market, the fees histori-
cally paid by Columbia in this case only establish that fair market
value must be something greater.
170 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
10, Amend, No. 1:98CV590 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (settled before disposition).
171 McCullough II, 67 Ohio St. 3d 463, 463 (1993).
172 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 10,
Amend, No. 1:98CV590 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (settled before disposition).
173 See Stipulated Dismissal Entry, Amend, No. 1:98CV590 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (setting
forth the terms of the settlement).
174 McCullough II, 67 Ohio St. 3d at 463.
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Moreover, lurking in the background of this "voluntary" sale is
the seller's knowledge that the buyer, if unhappy with the seller's
demanded price, has the authority to use the government's power of
eminent domain to simply take the property. The seller will be aware,
in most cases, that the storage operator must pay compensation. If the
storage operator argues, however, that the property owner will be un-
able to prove a market value higher than the going rate, the owner
might believe that she really has no option and decide to accept the
offer regardless of her opinion of the price. This further undermines
the reliability of other sales of similar rights as a measure of fair mar-
ket value.
It would seem that no matter how the argument is cast, when the
market has only one buyer, when that buyer possesses the power of
eminent domain, and when no one really knows what the right to be
sold would be worth in an open market, there is no way that even a
"voluntary" sale can be characterized as an arm's length transaction,
or as a truly voluntary sale between a willing seller and a willing
buyer. 175 Therefore, this information, even if available, should be
used by the factfinder with the utmost caution. Otherwise, the storage
operator would possess both the government's power of eminent do-
main and the power to determine the amount of just compensation to
be paid for the taking-a particularly troubling prospect where such
important rights are concerned.
In searching for a proper method of valuing underground gas
storage rights, the goal should be to find a method that arrives at a
value fair to both sides. An error either way has negative conse-
quences. If the property owner does not receive enough compensa-
tion for the taking, we as a society are asking them to shoulder more
of the public burden than is fair. If, on the other hand, the storage
operator is asked to pay more than a fair price, ultimately it is the
public that loses because the price is passed on to the consumer.176 In
175 This point is conceded by the attorney who represented Columbia in many of the con-
demnation actions discussed in this Note. According to Noble, supra note 8, § 26.11[4] n.19,
the problem with valuation methods that rely on historical payments by the storage operators "is
that the only entity purchasing these rights is the storage operator and it has condemnation
rights. As a result there are no arms length sales of underground gas storage easements or leases
because these sales are coercive by definition."
176 See id. § 26.1111]. Noble states:
Although the payment of the award in these cases does not come from the govern-
ment, its amount is nonetheless of concern to the public. The capital expenditures of
interstate pipelines are included in their rate base, and FERC allows recovery of
these expenditures from ratepayers. The ultimate victims of any excessive "com-
pensation" are residential consumers and other end-users of gas that has been trans-
ported through or sold at wholesale from the interstate pipeline system that owns the
particular storage field.
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a situation such as this, it seems that it should be incumbent upon
both sides to strive for a fair resolution of this issue, and to ardently
reject that which is not fair. In the real world, it is perhaps too ideal-
istic to hope that parties to a condemnation action would behave in
this manner. This makes it even more important for those called upon
to assist in finding a solution to these issues to keep in mind the over-
arching goal of balancing these equities.
The second method of determining value is both speculative and
controversial, although it rests on firm theoretical ground. The Ohio
Supreme Court phrased this second method of valuation in the fol-
lowing way:
2. The Existence of Sufficient Natural Gas Allowing for the
Commercial Recovery in Sale of the Natural Gas. A second
method of determining fair market value, and in turn just
compensation, rests upon evidence offered by landowner that
sufficient natural gas remains under the landowner tract so as
to allow the commercial recovery and sale of that natural gas.
If the landowner so proves, then in determining just compen-
sation, you may assess the foreseeable net income flow from
the property for its productive life reduced to a present value
figure.
In other words, in fixing just compensation, you would
determine the probable revenues and costs for the production
and sale of native natural gas from the condemned tract and
reduce the net sales value by the interest the landowners will
enjoy for an early, one time payment. 177
This method of establishing value appears to be reasonable, except
perhaps for the problem of proving the existence of the natural gas
reserves. The general justification for the constitutional edict that
property not be taken for public use without the payment of just com-
pensation is that one citizen alone should not be forced to shoulder
the public burden.1 78 Assuming the existence of recoverable reserves
of oil or gas beneath a property, if the condemnation of an easement
will prevent the owner from reaping the benefit of those reserves, an
enormous burden is shifted to the owner, and it would seem funda-
177 McCullough II, 67 Ohio St. 3d at 464.
178 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
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mental that the owner should be compensated for that lOSS. 179
The problem here would appear to be one of proof. One com-
mentator has dismissed the efforts of landowners to prove the exis-
tence of gas reserves on their properties through the use of expert
witnesses: "A more speculative enterprise is hard to imagine."180 The
difficulty seems to center around proving the production characteris-
tics and productive life of hypothetical wells, in addition to the price
of oil and gas over the length of that productive life. These factors
are notoriously difficult to predict accurately,181 and it therefore
seems only fair to require rigorous proof of such a claim. On the
other hand, if such proof exists, denying the right to recover on a
valid claim could cause an enormous burden to shift to the landowner.
The award of $213,798 to the landowners in the McCullough
case, for instance, was based on this method of valuation182 and was
awarded even though Columbia produced evidence that the fair mar-
ket value of the entire piece of property was only $154,200.183 The
commissioners, however, "found that [i]t is more likely than not that
commercially recoverable oil and gas reserves exist within the prop-
erty sought to be appropriated. ' ' 184 If the commissioners were right
about the evidence, it would have been an enormous blow to the
landowners, and constitutionally unjust, to take their property for
public use and deny them compensation for the loss of that income.
If, on the other hand, the commissioners were mistaken and made the
award erroneously, Columbia, and ultimately the public, were done a
serious disservice.
Because there is so much at stake if these issues are applicable to
a particular piece of property, it seems important both that the owner
should have the opportunity to present evidence regarding commer-
cially recoverable reserves of oil and gas, and that such evidence
should have to be very reliable to support a large judgment such as
the one in the McCullough case. This is a situation in which the only
fair solution seems to be that judges should screen experts carefully,
making strict use of the Daubert factors to determine reliability.
18 5
... See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) ('The owner is to be put in as
good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.").
Io Noble, supra note 8, § 26.11[4].
181 See id ("Courts ought to take judicial notice that oil and gas prices and interest rates
cannot be predicted for one year with any degree of accuracy, let alone for a 20 year period.").
182 See McCullough, 962 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (6th Cir. 1992). See also Noble, supra note
8, § 26.11[6] (discussing the McCullough case).
"' See McCullough, 962 F.2d at 1195.
14 Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
185 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-594 (1993) (explaining
factors to be considered by judges in determining the reliability of scientific evidence). See also
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The third alternative method that the McCullough opinion pro-
vides for determining value involves the more or less straightforward
consideration of rental incomes for gas storage:
3. The Fair Market Value of the Storage Easement Based
upon a Capitalization of Retail Income for the Right to Store
the Gas. If you do not find that there exists commercially re-
coverable reserves of oil and gas, a third alternative method
of finding fair market value, and in turn just compensation,
involves determining the fair market value of the storage
easement based upon a capitalization of the rental income for
the right to store the gas. In so determining, you shall use the
date of the filing of the condemnation as the starting point
and the termination of the storage field as the ending date.
Fair market value by a capitalization of the rental income
is determined by multiplying the acreage rental by the com-
parable storage rights to arrive at the present worth of the
future income stream. In applying this method, the fair mar-
ket value of the storage easement is equated to a capital sum
which, when invested as of the date of filing, would earn in-
come equal to the comparable storage rentals for the fu-
ture.
186
Although the heading of this section is confusing, 187 the court's un-
derlying meaning is evident. This factor simply provides the jury or
commission with a method for converting yearly per acre rentals into
a lump sum payment by calculating the present value of the future
income stream. This factor seems unremarkable and worth keeping in
the analysis with only one caveat: the yearly per acre rentals custom-
arily paid by the storage operator in "voluntary" transactions may not
reflect market value. The same caution should be applied in this
context as in the context of the "voluntary" sales. But again, if used
correctly, this method of valuation could be potentially helpful to the
factfinder in certain cases.
The next alternative method for determining value promulgated
by the McCullough court is actually the traditional method for deter-
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending Daubert's gatekeeping
obligation to all experts, not just "scientific" experts).
156 McCullough II, 67 Ohio St. 3d 463,464 (1993).
187 In fact, there appears to be a typographical error in the title sentence of this section,
which refers to "a Capitalization of Retail Income." Id. (emphasis added). The word "retail"
does not make much sense in this context, and the rest of the phrase is repeated later in the same
paragraph with the word "rental" substituted for the word "retail." It would seem that "rental"
rather than "retail" should have been used in the first sentence, as well.
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mining value in a "partial taking" case.188 Applied in an underground
natural gas storage case, this factor may or may not be dispositive, but
should be a part of any deliberations in such a case. The Ohio Su-
preme Court stated this factor in the following way:
4. Depreciation in the Fair Market Value of the Condemned
Tract as a Whole by Reason of the Taking of the Storage
Easement. This alternative method of determining fair mar-
ket value, and, in turn, just compensation, involves deter-
mining the difference in the fair market value of the entire
condemned tract before and after the taking. This determi-
nation is accomplished by establishing the fair market value
of the entire condemned tract before the taking and de-
ducti[ng] the fair market value of the entire tract immediately
after the taking. If this method is chosen to determine just
compensation, the fair market value of the storage easement
is equated to the difference, if any, between these be-
fore-and-after values of the entire condemned tract. 89
It has been argued that the underground storage of natural gas beneath
a property has no effect whatsoever on the surface use of the property,
and that an owner cannot therefore show any diminution in value due
to the taking. In many cases this will be true. A series of events that
took place in the early 1990s, however, provide a graphic illustration
of the way in which this factor could easily come to the forefront.
In 1992 an underground gas storage operation in Brenham,
Texas, experienced a catastrophic equipment failure resulting in a
massive explosion that caused three fatalities and several other inju-
ries.' 9 The explosion also destroyed dozens of homes and structures
in the area, causing millions of dollars in property damage in the sur-
rounding community.' 9' One media account stated that "the bucolic
area... looked as if it had been hit by a tornado carrying a torch.
Grass, shrubbery and other vegetation were charred. Trees were bro-
ken like matchsticks or reduced to stumps. Cars were blown off the
188 See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 624-25 (1963) (explaining that in the partial taking
case before the Court, damages were "to be measured by the difference in market value of the
[owner's] land before and after the interference or partial taking.").
"9 McCullough 11, 67 Ohio St. 3d at 464-65.
190 See Terry Klewer, Brenham Gas Leak Sends 350 From Homes, HOUSTON CHRON.,
June 5, 1997, at A29. See also The Big Numbers of 1996; Environmental, NAT'L LAw J., Feb.
10, 1997, at C2 (stating that the explosion caused three deaths).
191 See Carlos Byars et al., Hot Blast "was Chaos," Brenham's Gas Blowout Felt for
Miles, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 8, 1992 at Al ("Judge Dorothy Morgan said it was apparent that
at least 50 structures were destroyed or heavily damaged."); Kliewer, supra note 190, at A29
("A passing car touched off a massive explosion that wrecked a number of homes, killed three
people and injured at least 20 others. Property damage was estimated at $9 million.").
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road. Dead livestock were sprawled on the ground."' 192 At Rice Uni-
versity in Houston, sixty-five miles away, a seismograph registered
the blast as a four on the Richter Scale. 193 A lawsuit brought by vic-
tims of the blast eventually resulted in a jury award of $5.4 million in
compensatory damages and $138 million in punitive damages.
194
In response to the Brenham explosion, the Texas legislature
passed bills requiring that the Texas Railroad Commission set strict
safety standards regulating the underground storage of petrochemical
products, including propane and natural gas. 195  The bills gave the
Commission the authority to levy fines of up to $25,000 per viola-
tion. 196 The Texas Railroad Commission subsequently promulgated
new rules that covered not only the storage of liquefied petroleum gas
("LP gas") in underground salt domes (the type of facility that ex-
ploded in Brenham), but also the underground storage of natural gas
in depleted geological formations like those at issue in this Note.
97
The response of the Texas legislature in regulating both LP gas and
natural gas facilities because of an explosion at an LP gas facility il-
lustrates that the different types of storage facilities are thought of as
at least similar, if not identical, in risk, by politicians as well as by
members of the general public.198
This explosion is relevant because such dramatic events make
news headlines all over the country. These news headlines affect po-
tential buyers' perceptions of value, and buyers' perceptions of value,
accurate or not, have a significant impact on actual property values.
And this story clearly reverberated from coast to coast. 199
192 Byars et al., supra note 191, at Al.
193 See id.
'94 The punitive damage award was subsequently reduced by the trial judge to $70.2 mil-
lion pursuant to Texas law capping punitives. See The Big Numbers of 1996, supra note 190, at
C2.
195 See Senate Passes Bill Regulating Underground Gas Storage Facilities, UPI, May 26,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
196 See id.
197 See TRC Tightens Underground Storage Regulations, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, OcL 6,
1993, at 2 (setting forth three proposed rules for underground storage of all hydrocarbons).
198 It also illustrates the seeming futility of such legislative endeavors. Brenham recently
experienced another massive gas leak, this time from a leaking well that once again enveloped
part of the town in a huge cloud of explosive vapor. On this occasion the vapor did not explode,
but hundreds of people had to be evacuated from their homes until authorities could get the
situation under control. See Kliewer, supra note 190, at A29.
199 See Catherine Chriss & Patti Muck, Gas Explosion Flattens Rural Area, HOUSTON
CHRON., Apr. 7, 1992, at Al; Gas Blast Rocks Big Texas Area; Boy Killed and 18 Injured in a
Zone of Devastation, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 8 1992, at A3; J. Michael Kennedy,
One Killed, 18 Injured in Texas Gas Explosion, L.A. TamEs, Apr. 8, 1992, at A3; J. Michael
Kennedy, Texas Gas Explosion Kills Boy, 6; Pipeline Blast Hits 4.0 on Richter Scale, WASH.
POST, Apr. 8, 1992, at A3; Roberto Suro, Gas Explosion Tears Through Texas Pastures, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1992, at A17; CBS Evening News: Gas Pipeline Explodes in Texas, Causes One
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Although the type of facility in Brenham was very different from
the natural gas storage fields in use in much of the country, involving
the storage of LP gas rather than natural gas in a different type of
geological formation, it seems unlikely that the average member of
the public distinguishes between types of underground gas storage
fields, much less understands those distinctions. In fact, some reports
in the media traced the explosion to "natural gas" or simply "gas,"
failing to distinguish between heavier than air LP gas, and lighter than
air natural gas.200 Further, the Texas legislature responded to this cri-
sis by regulating safety at natural gas facilities as well as LP gas fa-
cilities, indicating that they, too, took the events at Brenham as cause
to worry about natural gas as well as LP gas facilities.201
The significance of all of this is the potential negative impact on
fair market value of a property subject to an underground natural gas
storage easement. In very simple terms, when given the choice of a
property not above an underground natural gas storage facility, or an
identical property above such a facility, most buyers would choose to
buy the property that is not above the storage field.20 2
When demand for a good falls and supply remains constant,
price will fall as well. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court properly
adopted this factor for use in determining the value of underground
natural gas storage rights. Values arrived at using this method might,
in some cases, significantly exceed the four or five dollars per acre
per year customarily paid by some gas companies. 203 It also seems
Death; Destruction (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 7, 1992); CNN News: Gas Explosion In-
jures 16 in Texas (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 7, 1992).
20 See Kennedy, One Killed, supra note 199, at A3 (identifying the source of the explo-
sion simply as "gas"); Kliewer, supra note 190, at A29 (misidentifying the source of the explo-
sion as natural gas); CNN News, supra note 199 (misidentifying the source of the explosion as
natural gas).
201 See Senate Passes Bill, supra note 195.
202 The fact that buyers will make the leap from negative publicity about LP gas storage to
worrying about living over a natural gas storage field is illustrated by a story from Katy, Texas.
Prior to the Brenham explosion, a Denver company called Western Gas Resources Storage was
moving ahead with plans to convert a local depleted geological formation 7,000 feet under-
ground into a natural gas storage facility. They had already encountered opposition from the
Katy community, and the Brenham accident struck fear into the hearts of local residents. When
officials from Western Gas Resources Storage tried to assuage the community's fears by ex-
plaining that the natural gas to be stored beneath Katy was unlikely to cause a Brenham-type
disaster because it had entirely different properties from the liquefied natural gas that caused the
explosion in Brenham, residents were not impressed. "'Our point is, gas will explode, whether
it be liquid propane or natural gas,' said [one property owner]. 'And when it's in that concen-
trated, condensed volume, we could have a worse scenario than what is in Brenham."' Patti
Muck, The Blast Near Brenham; Blast Hits Close to Home for Those Over Reservoir, HOUSTON
CHRON., Apr. 9, 1992, at A26. Whether or not this property owner was correct in her assess-
ment of the relative risks of propane and natural gas storage, her perception, and the similar
perceptions of others, are certain to impact property values.
2 3 In the Katy, Texas situation described above, for example, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that the values of local properties above the gas storage field were significantly impacted.
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likely that in many cases there may be no reduction in fair market
value.204 Used appropriately, this factor is a vital element to be con-
sidered when determining the value of an underground natural gas
storage easement, and is worth including as an element of any statu-
tory solution, or any jurisdiction's formula for determining value.
The fifth factor enumerated in the McCullough opinion is rela-
tively minor, but deserves some consideration. The Ohio Supreme
Court formulated this factor in the folowing way:
5. Mineral leases. The existence of a lease for the production
of native oil and gas from the property is not evidence of the
existence of such oil and gas. However, you must award
nominal damages to the holder of such a lease even if the
presence of native oil and gas in paying quantities is not
proven to a reasonable probability.2 -
Given the Constitution's mandate that private property not be taken
for public use without the payment of just compensation, the justifi-
cation for this factor seems self-evident. At the same time, the fact-
finder is cautioned against using the mere existence of a lease as
proof of the existence of economically significant oil and gas re-
serves. This appears to be a prudent and justified element of value in
cases where it is applicable.
The last factor promulgated by the McCullough court is not actu-
ally an element of value, but rather an instruction that provides guid-
ance to the factfinder and specifically identifies an element that is not
to be considered:
6. Viewpoint of value. Just compensation is measured from
the point of view of the landowner. The yardstick is what the
landowner has lost, not what Columbia has gained. There-
fore, you are not to consider the value of the storage ease-
ment to Columbia, nor may you consider any increase or in-
crement in value by virtue of the activities of Columbia in
reference to the gas storage field for which the easement is
acquired. For example, if there is, within the storage ease-
Furthermore, it does not seem like much of a stretch to take it one step further and conclude that
in most parts of the country, properties located over underground natural gas storage fields were
worth something less in April of 1992 than they had been in March of that year.
2 If, for example, an owner purchased property that is a "window" in an existing storage
field, and if the existence of the field and the property's position over it was well known at the
time of the purchase, an argument can be made that any reduction in the market value of the
property by virtue of the storage field's existence was already taken into account in the price
that the owner paid for the property. If so, the property's fair market value would not be further
reduced by condemnation of the storage easement.
2o5 McCullough II, 67 Ohio St. 3d 463,465 (1993).
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ment, some amount of native oil and gas, but not in paying
quantities, so that they had no effect on the market value of
the subject tract on the date of taking, you would not take na-
tive oil and gas into account.
206
This admonishment is firmly grounded in eminent domain jurispru-
dence and should be part of the factfinder's analysis whether or not it
was specifically set forth in these instructions.2 7 So, rather than pro-
viding a method of determining value, this part of the valuation meth-
odology merely serves as a reminder that this area of the law is firmly
established.
The factors for determining the value of an underground natural
gas storage easement promulgated in McCullough are flexible enough
to accommodate the varying requirements of individual cases and yet
tailored to the specific needs of the underground natural gas storage
context. They comport with the constitutional requirement that just
compensation be paid to the land owner, and yet, if used properly,
will also protect the interests of the public that ultimately will pay for
the rights being purchased. In short, the McCullough approach to
determining value is worthy of emulation by other state or federal
courts and should therefore be considered when they are called upon
to determine value in an underground gas storage case.
B. State Trespass Claims Should Not Be Preempted By Federal Law
The next issue to be addressed is the question of whether an ac-
tion for trespass should be permitted in cases where a storage field
was in operation for some period of time prior to the institution of
condemnation or trespass proceedings. The property owner in such a
case may sue or counter-claim for trespass, and the storage operator
may claim that the owner's state law trespass claim is preempted by
federal law, leaving them with only a federal inverse condemnation
remedy. 20 8 The stakes are large in this dispute because punitive dam-
M id.
207 See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710
(1999) ("[I]n determining just compensation, 'the question is what has the owner lost, not what
has the taker gained."') (quoting Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195
(1910)); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943) (explaining that the property's "spe-
cial value to the condemnor as distinguished from others who may or may not possess the power
to condemn, must be excluded as an element of market value."); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548,
574 (1897) ("The just compensation required by the Constitution to be made to the owner is to
be measured by the loss caused to him by the appropriation.").
20 There are several cases that have presented just these arguments, and more if one looks
as well to Natural Gas Act condemnations involving pipeline construction in addition to those
relating to the underground storage of natural gas. See, e.g., Humphries v. Williams Natural
Gas Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (D. Kan. 1999) (involving condemnation action filed in pipeline
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ages are permitted in trespass claims, but not in inverse condemnation
claims.2°
For obvious reasons, this distinction is important not only to the
property owner who feels that he has been wronged, but to the storage
operator, as well. In the case of a storage operator with large numbers
of window properties above its storage fields, a large punitive dam-
ages judgment in a single case could provide a very dangerous prece-
dent leading to the eventual multiplication of that judgment many
times over. And, of course, a resolution of this issue is not unimpor-
tant to the public, either. If the storage operator is permitted to pass
the cost of punitive damages through to the public in the cost of gas,
then the public, rather than the storage operator, is punished for con-
duct which it did not authorize and over which it had no control. On
the other hand, if punitive damages are not assessed, the storage op-
erator may have no incentive to follow proper procedures, and may in
fact have an incentive not to follow them.
The weight of authority on this point holds that a trespass action
is not preempted by the federal law of inverse condemnation. Indeed,
there are strong public policy arguments in favor of such a conclu-
sion. A good place to start an analysis of this issue is an examination
of the existing case law.
1. The Strange Tale of Bowman210 and Arnholte"
The two leading cases on whether to allow a state law action for
trespass against a federally regulated storage operator both pertained
to storage fields operated by Columbia in Northeast Ohio. Both in-
volved a claim of trespass by the owner against Columbia and an ar-
gument by Columbia that the property owner's trespass claim was
preempted by federal law, and both were tried before the same trial
judge. Despite these similarities, Arnholt, decided only four years
after Bowman, reaches a much different conclusion. 12
In Bowman, the court had allowed the property owner's trespass
claim to be tried to a jury and had permitted punitive damages to be
assessed against Columbia.1 3 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
case); Amholt, 747 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (underground gas storage case); Bowman v.
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 1988 WL 68890 (6th Cir. July 6, 1988) (same).
2o9 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
210 1988 WL 68890 (6th Cir. July 6, 1988).
212 747 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
212 See Amholt, 747 F. Supp. at 402-03 (rejecting Bowman's reasoning and holding for the
storage operator).
213 Columbia was ordered to pay a total of $48,321.75 to the Bowmans, which included
$10,021.75 for condemnation of the property and $8,300 in compensatory damages, plus
$30,000 in punitive damages in the trespass action. See Bowman, 1988 WL 68890, at *1.
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the judgment of punitive damages, but held that the issue of preemp-
tion of the owner's state law trespass claim had not been properly
preserved for appeal and thus addressed only the question of whether• 214
the evidence supported the punitive damage award.
Subsequently, in Arnholt, the district court held, contrary to
Bowman, that the trespass claim was preempted by federal law and
thus that the property owners were limited to an inverse condemna-
tion claim.215 The court reasoned that the operation of underground
natural gas storage fields like those at issue in the case come "within
the purview of the Natural Gas Act.' 216 The court further found that
the "Supreme Court has protected the federal jurisdiction under the
Natural Gas Act from direct and indirect state regulation,"21 7 and that
therefore
[tjhe Court concludes that the State of Ohio has no power to
regulate, directly or indirectly, a natural gas storage field cer-
tificated by the Federal Energy Regulation [sic] Commission
(FERC). The Court finds that such an invocation of preemp-
tion applies to the exercise of eminent domain powers
whether exercised by the U.S. Government or by a private
company granted the power of eminent domain such as has
been accorded Columbia in connection with its Weaver Stor-
age Field for the storage of natural gas. 8
The court provided additional justification for holding that the tres-
pass claim was preempted by federal law by reasoning that the federal
law of eminent domain, deriving from the constitutional dictate of just
compensation contained in the Fifth Amendment, does not forbid a
taking of private property. It simply requires that just compensation
be paid for that property, and that a federal inverse condemnation
claim is therefore the appropriate remedy.219 Significantly, as the
above quoted language indicates, the court did not distinguish be-
tween a taking accomplished by the United States government and
one accomplished by a private corporation to which the power of
eminent domain was delegated.220
214 See id. at *2 ("[IThe only issue preserved for appeal is whether the evidence supported
the award of punitive damages, as this was the only issue raised in Columbia's motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.").
215 See Amholt, 747 F. Supp. at 402-03.
216 Id at 404.
217 ad
21 id.
219 See id. ("Federal eminent domain law, anchored in the Fifth Amendment... does not
prohibit the taking but rather places a condition of the taking, i.e., just compensation.").
m See id.
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And what about the fact that Bowman had been affirmed two
years before by the Sixth Circuit? Technically, the Court of Appeals
had not reached the issue of preemption, and the court relied on that
in Arnholt, handling the issue in a footnote to its opinion:
The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the award of damages for
trespass in Bowman, held that Columbia had failed to pre-
serve for appellate purposes its claim that the property owner
was limited to a cause of action for inverse condemnation
and could not pursue the trespass action. Thus, the only
precedent on the inverse condemnation [issue] . . . is this
Court's opinion in Bowman.
221
It is, of course, true that the Sixth Circuit did not reach the issue of
preemption, and that it therefore left the door open for the lower
courts to choose not to follow that portion of the Bowman decision. 22
There is much more to the Bowman opinion, however, than is implied
by this simple characterization.
This point is best illustrated by the court's own words. In Bow-
man the Sixth Circuit explained that under Ohio law, both actual
damages and actual malice must be proven to support an award of
punitive damages.223 It also noted that the nominal damages that, at a
minimum, are presumed to flow from a proven trespass are sufficient
to meet the requirement for actual damages. 2 4 The court went on:
Similarly, the requirement that actual malice be demonstrated
is also easily satisfied. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a case
in which an award of punitive damages would be more ap-
propriate. Despite being continually informed that the
Bowmans did not wish to lease their tract, and despite having
ample notice that the Bowmans intended to use their land in a
manner wholly incompatible with the subterranean storage of
gas, Columbia intentionally concealed the fact that they were
using the property for twenty years without any compensa-
tion, just or otherwise. Presumably, this willful unauthorized
expropriation would have been continued indefinitely had the
Bowmans not signed a lease to retrieve gas from their own
property, thereby forcing Columbia's hand. Columbia's ac-
tions went beyond mere negligence; their willful and outra-
22' Id. at 403 n.2.
2 See Bowman v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 1988 WL 68890, at *2 (6th Cir.
July 6, 1988).
2' See id. at *2.
22 See id.
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geous character amply supported an award of punitive dam-
ages. -
Additionally, in a concurring opinion, Jidge Ryan argued that the
Bowman court should have gone further and reached the merits of the
case:
Columbia's motion for partial summary judgment was based
on the theory that Maxine Bowman's sole recourse was an
action for inverse condemnation, and that she was, therefore,
precluded from pursuing her state law trespass claim. The
value to Columbia of such limitation is that punitive dam-
ages, permissible in a trespass claim under Ohio law, are not
available in an inverse condemnation action under federal
law. The district court, as a matter of law, correctly rejected
this theory.
226
Thus, although the preemption issue was not reached in Bow-
man, the reader is left with the impression that had the court reached
the merits, the outcome would not have been favorable to Colum-
bia.227 Certainly it seems disingenuous to characterize the Bowman
opinion merely as one that did not reach the issue at hand, implying
that it has nothing further to add with regard to the issue. The Sixth
Circuit used extraordinarily strong language in condemning the con-
duct of Columbia.228
One who looks only to these two opinions for guidance, then,
finds that collectively they are something less than dispositive on the
issue of federal preemption of trespass claims. The Bowman opinion,
while strong in its condemnation of Columbia's conduct (and with an
even stronger concurring opinion), fails to explicitly resolve the issue.
The Arnholt opinion takes a clear position on the issue, but is (1) a
lower court opinion that has not withstood the test of an appeal; (2)
less compelling from the start because the first time the same court
m Id. (emphases added).
26 Id. (Ryan, J., concurring). Judge Ryan would have further held that Columbia's actions
did in fact constitute trespass.
m7 Another possible explanation of the court's opinion is that two of the three panel mem-
bers felt that, had they reached the inverse condemnation issue, they would have had to hold that
the inverse condemnation claim did preempt the trespass claim. However, they were so out-
raged at Columbia's conduct, they felt equity demanded that the result be upheld. The solution:
find a way not to reach the issue of preemption, reserving resolution of that issue for another
day and reaching the equitable result in the instant case.
m See Bowman, 1988 WL 68890, at *3 ("Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a case in which
an award of punitive damages would be more appropriate... Columbia's actions went beyond
mere negligence; their willful and outrageous character amply supported an award of punitive
damages.").
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faced the issue it came out the other way;229 (3) vulnerable to attack
on major points of reasoning upon which the court relied; and (4) a
decision that at least one other court that has faced the same issue has
refused to follow.
230
While this in no way means that the Arnholt opinion is not wor-
thy of consideration, it does motivate one to delve more deeply into
the reasoning behind the decision. Upon closer examination one dis-
covers that the decision does not stand up well to scrutiny.
2. The Trouble with Arnholt
The Arnholt court relied heavily on an argument that because the
underground storage of natural gas by firms transporting or selling
gas in interstate commerce is regulated by the federal Natural Gas
Act, and because the U.S. Supreme Court has protected the jurisdic-
tion of the Natural Gas Act from regulation by the states, that federal
law necessarily preempts the state law trespass claim.231 This argu-
ment, however, paints preemption doctrine as it has been applied to
the Natural Gas Act with far too broad a brush.
While it is true that the courts have struck down various state
regulations, holding that they were preempted by provisions of the
Natural Gas Act,232 it is also true that other state regulations have
been upheld.233 The determination as to whether Congress exercised
its power to preempt state law requires an analysis of congressional
m One searches the Arnholt decision in vain for the source of the epiphany that caused the
court to change its mind after the Bowman case. Although the opinion elaborates the court's
reasoning, the arguments relied upon all existed at the time of Bowman. Arnholt fails to identify
a specific reason why the court chose to reject those arguments in Bowman, yet follow them in
Arnholt, other than "further reflection and reconsideration of the issue." Arnholt, 747 F. Supp.
401,403 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
230 See Humphries v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1281 (D. Kan. 1999)
("This court disagrees with [the Arnholt opinion] because it fails to recognize that the gas com-
pany bringing the condemnation action is a private corporation, and that unlike the federal gov-
ernment, its only authority to condemn property is grounded in § 717f(h).").
2' SeeArnholt, 747 F. Supp. at 403-04.
232 See, e.g., Williams Natural Gas Co. v. City of Oklahoma City, 890 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding that state court order enjoining construction of pipeline for which a FERC cer-
tificate had been issued constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the FERC order);
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988) (holding that Michigan law regulating
the issuance of securities by companies engaged in the sale or transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce was preempted by the federal regulatory scheme contained in the Natural
Gas Act).
233 See, e.g., Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493 (1989)
(holding that the challenged state regulation governing the production of natural gas was not
preempted by the Natural Gas Act); Federal Power Comm'n v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 337
U.S. 498 (1949) (holding that the Natural Gas Act does not grant the Federal Power Commis-
sion (which later became the FERC) the authority to regulate the transfer of gas leases, but
instead reserved that power for the states).
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intent.2 4 The circumstances in which a court should find that Con-
gress intended to preempt state law have been enumerated as follows:
In the absence of explicit statutory language signaling an in-
tent to pre-empt, we infer such intent where Congress has
legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regu-
lation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal
law, or where the state law at issue conflicts with federal law,
either because it is impossible to comply with both, or be-
cause the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of congressional objectives.3 5
Another basis for finding preemption was described by the Court
in the Northwest Central Pipeline opinion: "Where state law impacts
on matters within FERC's control, the State's purpose must be to
regulate production or other subjects of state jurisdiction, and the
means chosen must at least plausibly be related to matters of legiti-
mate state concern.
' 236
In the case of the Natural Gas Act, not only is there no explicit
language signaling Congress's intent to legislate comprehensively in
the natural gas field, there is explicit language to the contrary. In en-
acting the Natural Gas Act, Congress put in place a system of regula-
tion that the Supreme Court has described as a "dual regulatory
scheme," 37 carefully dividing between the states and the federal gov-
ernment the power to regulate in the natural gas field. 38 Congress
"did not envisage federal regulation of the entire natural-gas field to
the limit of constitutional power. Rather it contemplated the exercise
of federal power as specified in the Act."239 Further, "[t]he Natural
Gas Act was designed to supplement state power and to produce a
harmonious and comprehensive regulation of the industry. Neither"
state nor federal regulatory body was to encroach upon the jurisdic-
tion of the oter."2 40 Several areas of regulation were expressly re-
2 See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 299 (holding that "[a] pre-emption question requires an
examination of congressional intent").
235 Northwest Cent. Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 509 (internal citations omitted). See also Schnei-
dewind, 485 U.S. at 299-300 (holding that "[i]n the absence of explicit statutory language...
Congress implicitly may indicate an intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state
law").
236 Northwest Cent. Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 518.
237 d at514.
238 See id at 510.
239 Federal Power Comm'n v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Corp., 337 U.S. 498,502-03 (1949).
24 Id. at 513 (citations omitted). Panhandle includes analysis of the legislative history of
the Natural Gas Act that makes clear Congress's intent to limit federal powers and to reserve to
the states those areas which they had traditionally regulated. The Court included in its opinion
this explanatory statement made by the sponsor of the bill during debate in the House:
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served to the states, including natural gas production or gathering.241
Based on the foregoing considerations, it is abundantly clear that
state regulation in the natural gas field is not, per se, repugnant to the
provisions of the Natural Gas Act. The statute does not explicitly
preempt state law in the area in question, and one may not infer an
intent to preempt on the part of Congress because the language of the
statute and its legislative history explicitly repudiate that idea, instead
pointing to a system of regulation divided between the state and fed-
eral governments. Even a state regulation that has some effect on
matters under federal control is not automatically considered pre-
empted.242 Therefore, a state law trespass claim against a storage op-
erator survives this portion of the preemption analysis.
State trespass law also meets the requirement that the state regu-
lation have a proper purpose. The state's purpose is to regulate prop-
erty rights, a matter clearly within the state's traditional jurisdiction,
and the means chosen, trespass law, is plausibly related to matters of
state concern.
The only other valid ground for finding that a state law trespass
action is preempted by federal law would be that the state law con-
flicts with the federal law. The Court has enumerated two tests for
finding such a conflict, the first being whether it is impossible to
comply with both the state and the federal law.243 Clearly that is not
The primary purpose of the pending bill is to provide Federal regulation, in those
cases where the State commissions lack authority, under the interstate-commerce
law. This bill takes nothing from the State commissions; they retain all the State
power they have at the present time. This bill would apply to the transportation of
natural gas in interstate commerce and to the sale of natural gas in interstate com-
merce for resale or public consumption.
Id. (quoting 81 CONG. REC. 6721). During the Senate debate, Sen. Wheeler put it even more
succinctly: "'There is no attempt and can be no attempt under the provisions of the .bill to regu-
late anything in the field except where it is not regulated at the present time. It applies only as
to interstate commerce and only to the wholesale price of gas."' Id. (quoting 81 CONG. REC.
9313).
24 See Northwest Cent. Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 510.
242 See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 308 (1988) ("Of course, every
state statute that has some indirect effect on rates and facilities of natural gas companies is not
pre-empted.").
This topic was also discussed in Northwest Central Pipeline, where the Court said:
To find field pre-emption of Kansas's regulation merely because purchasers' costs
and hence rates might be affected would be largely to nullify that part of NGA §
l(b) that leaves to the States control over production, for there can be little if any
regulation of production that might not have at least an incremental effect on the
costs of purchasers in some market and contractual situations.
489 U.S. at 514.
24 See Northwest Cent. Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 509. An example of a case in which it was
impossible to comply with both the state and federal regulations is Williams Natural Gas Co. v.
City of Oklahoma City, 890 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1989). In that case, Williams Natural Gas was
issued a FERC certificate that granted it the right to serve a large industrial customer and to
build a pipeline for that purpose. A local, state-regulated distribution company had also com-
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the case here. In fact, if a storage operator were in compliance with
the Natural Gas Act, trespass would not be an issue. The statute di-
rects that a storage operator first attempt to privately contract for the
underground storage rights and, if unsuccessful, then institute con-
demnation proceedings. 244 The statute does not provide that if the
storage operator is unsuccessful in contracting for the rights that it
may simply use the property without condemnation proceedings and
without providing just compensation. A storage operator only runs
afoul of the state trespass law when it stops short of complying with
the Natural Gas Act and uses property without the right to do so.
Conversely, if one is in compliance with the Natural Gas Act, one is
also in compliance with the state law of trespass, and therefore it is
plainly not impossible to comply with both.
The second test for finding an impermissible conflict between
the state and federal law is whether the state law "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of congressional objec-
tives. 245 Again, it seems elementary that, unless one includes the
taling of property without the payment of compensation on the list of
congressional objectives, an action for trespass like those contem-
plated here would not frustrate the objectives of Congress. To the
extent that the prospect of state law trespass actions might encourage
storage operators to strictly comply with the provisions of the Natural
Gas Act, one can make a strong argument that, rather than being an
obstacle to congressional goals, state trespass actions in fact further
congressional objectives.
Based on this traditional preemption analysis, using the rules
promulgated by the Supreme-Court in other cases involving the Natu-
ral Gas Act, it seems clear that there is no basis to find that the type of
state trespass claim at issue in this Note is preempted by federal law.
Also, going back to the valuation methodology issue and applying the
same preemption analysis to the concept of using state law to provide
the method of valuing property, there would seem to be no conflict
and hence no preemption there as well. Using state methods for
valuing property would not make it impossible to comply with both
state law and the Act-instead, they would be complementary in pre-
cisely the way envisioned in Congress. Nor would state valuation
peted for that business. When the certificate was granted to Williams, the local company filed a
state court action that resulted in the state court issuing an order permanently enjoining Wil-
liams from constructing the pipeline that FERC had authorized. See id. This clearly shows that
it can be impossible to comply with both state and federal law, and the state court action was
held to be an impermissible collateral attack on the FERC order. See id. at 257.
244 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
245 Northwest Cent. Pipeline, 489 U.S. at 509.
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methods in any way frustrate congressional objectives.246
There is another issue that should be discussed here in addition
to preemption, however. The reason that the doctrine of inverse con-
demnation exists is that the federal government has the power to sim-
ply take property without formal proceedings and without the pay-
ment of compensation at the time of the taking, although this is an
officially disfavored method of taking. The government must still
provide compensation, but in such cases it is incumbent upon the
property owner to petition the government for redress.
The question, then, is whether the power to take property by
physical possession was included in the grant of federal eminent do-
main power to private corporations contained in the Natural Gas Act.
Both case law and public policy arguments suggest a negative answer
to this question.
It was partly on this basis that the court in Humphries v. Wil-
liams Natural Gas Co.247 disagreed with Arnholt. The Humphries
court stated "[t]his court disagrees with this portion of the opinion in
[Arnholt] because it fails to recognize that the gas company bringing
the condemnation action is a private corporation, and that unlike the
federal government, its only authority to condemn property is
grounded in § 717f(h). '248 The court came to the conclusion that
nothing in the Natural Gas Act gave the storage operator the power to
take immediate possession of property without either an agreement
with the owner or the completion of formal condemnation proceed-
ings.249 The Humphries court thus stated that "this court does not be-
2 For a thoughtful analysis of the issue of whether state or federal law should provide the
basis for determining value in this type of case, see McCullough, 962 F.2d 1192, 1198 (6th Cir.
1992).
27 48 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (D. Kan. 1999). Humphries presented a factual situation that was
very closely analogous to both Bowman and Arnholt, although it involved the construction of a
pipeline rather than an underground natural gas storage field. Williams Natural Gas was granted
a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the FERC, which authorized it to construct
a pipeline. In the process of construction, Williams entered Humphries's property with employ-
ees and heavy construction equipment, taking the property without any formal condemnation
proceedings or payment of compensation for the taking. Humphries filed a trespass action, and
in response Williams filed a condemnation action in federal court, claiming that federal law
preempted the state court trespass claim. Before reaching the issue of whether the Natural Gas
Act authorized Williams to take property without formal proceedings, the court performed a
preemption analysis like that engaged in above, finding that:
Had [Williams] followed the letter and intent of § 717f(h), the court would agree
that all of Humphries' state law claims for trespass and unlawful taking would be
preempted by federal law. In this case, however, [Williams] did not scrupulously
abide by the terms of § 717f(h). The court finds that [Williams's] condemnation ac-
tion does not preempt Humphries' claims that existed prior to the date that [Wil-
liams] filed its condemnation action.
Id. at 1279.
248 Humphries, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
24 See id. at 1279-83.
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lieve.that Congress intended the condemnation authority granted by §
717f(h) to cloak holders of certificates of public convenience and ne-
cessity with impunity to commit trespasses and other civil wrongs.
' ' 50
Another district court that reached the same conclusion as Hum-
phries explained its reasoning this way:
Although the plaintiff possesses the authority pursuant to Ti-
tle 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) [the Natural Gas Act] to exercise the
right of eminent domain, this right is not in itself sufficient to
authorize the taking of immediate possession prior to the
condemnation proceeding itself. The authority to take imme-
diate possession conferred by the Declaration of Taking Act
and similar statutes which confer the authority to take imme-
diate possession is reserved to the United States. No statu-
tory authority exists which would authorize a private party,
such as the plaintiff, to take immediate possession of the real
property prior to the condemnation proceeding. Similarly,
the authority to take immediate possession of the property
cannot be implied in the mere grant to the plaintiff of the
right to eminent domain because the language of Title 15
U.S.C. § 717f(h) is unequivocal. In addition, if an ambiguity
were found in the statute the result would not change because
statutes conferring the right of eminent domain are strictly
construed to exclude those rights not expressly granted. 25
These are compelling arguments, and they can be bolstered by public
policy arguments, as well. Even for the federal government, which
has the .power to take property without formal proceedings or pay-
ment, this method of taking property is officially disfavored. 52 It
2'o 111 at 1282.
25 Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.N.D.
1981). The court went on to conclude, however, that the plaintiff had legitimate reason to ob-
tain immediate possession of the property for construction of a pipeline and that the court had
the authority to grant such equitable relief. The court then issued an order granting plaintiff the
right to take immediate possession of the property, but only after plaintiff had deposited an
amount of money equal to three times the plaintiff's estimate of the amount of just compensa-
tion. See id. See also USG Pipeline Co. v. 1.74 Acres in Marion Cty., Tenn., 1 F. Supp. 2d 816,
825 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) The USG Pipeline court reasoned:
USGP's acquisition of a FERC Certificate cloaks it with the federal power of emi-
nent domain pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). However, nothing in the Natural Gas
Act automatically authorizes the possessor of an FERC Certificate to take immediate
possession of the property sought to be condemned prior to the condemnation pro-
ceeding. Plaintiff has not directed the Court to anything in the Act it contends grants
such authority.
Id. The USG Pipeline court went on to conclude, as did the court in Northern Border Pipeline,
that the plaintiff had a legitimate need for immediate possession, and that the court had the
authority to grant such equitable relief. The court ordered that possession be granted to the
pipeline company, but again after the deposit of funds with the court. See id.
252 See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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does not make sense to grant this power to a private corporation nec-
essarily driven by the profit motive. From the shareholders' point of
view, for example, would it be responsible for a corporation to vol-
untarily pay for property that it could use for free? In the under-
ground gas storage business, storage operators have discovered that
they can use window properties for decades, and perhaps indefinitely,
without paying for their use. Because storage is unobservable and, in
most cases, does not interfere with the surface use of the property,
owners of window properties only infrequently institute action against
the storage operator. Most, if not all, of the cases that have arisen in
this context so far present themselves when some event precipitates a
need for the storage operator to condemn the property in order to
protect the storage field, as in the case of an owner about to drill into
the field. 3 This means that a storage operator can reap considerable
savings by condemning only these window properties and allowing
the vast majority of them to go uncondemned and thus uncompen-
sated.
Storage operators have argued that the owners of these window
properties have turned down the operator's offer to privately contract
for the rights, and thus that the owners have failed to do what is nec-
essary for them to be paid. 4 The argument has even been made that
the owner is therefore not entitled to any compensation for the taking
of their property.255 But this is precisely backwards. The mandate of
the Natural Gas Act's grant of eminent domain power is explicit. The
storage operator is required to attempt to privately contract for the
rights and, if unsuccessful, must then commence a condemnation ac-
tion in the courts to acquire the rights.256 The burden of moving the
process forward should be on the storage operator, not the landowner.
A property owner does not need to earn the right to be justly compen-
sated for the taking of his property-that right is guaranteed by the
Constitution. A failure to complete the condemnation process must
result in a lack of property rights for the storage operator, not the
taking of rights from the owner without compensation.
23 See Noble, supra note 8, § 26.06[2] (explaining the use of condemnation procedures to
halt drilling operations that might threaten the integrity of the storage field).
25 See Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment at 8, Amend, No. 1:98CV590 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (settled before
disposition) ("Defendants claim they should receive, at least, as much as Columbia has paid
their neighbors with interest. They now want to be paid the money they previously refused to
accept. The time for this has passed. If they had given Columbia a lease or an easement, Co-
lumbia would have paid them for it. They did not do what they had to do in order to be paid.").
255 See id. ("They want this court to award them the money they could have earned even
though they refused to do what they needed to do to earn it. This is like a lazy bum claiming it
is only fair that he should receive the same wages as the people who worked all day.").
256 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1994). See also supra note 64.
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Another reason that this power should not be granted to the stor-
age operators is that the district courts have shown a willingness to
use their equitable power to provide certificate holders in legitimate
need with immediate possession of the property. The courts that have
provided this relief have generally required that the company deposit
funds with the court prior to possession' 2 7  This process provides
what would appear to be a necessary means of oversight over the ac-
tivities of storage operators.2
8
It seems logical to conclude that certificate holders should be re-
quired to strictly follow the procedure set forth in the Natural Gas
Act. The Act does not explicitly grant the power to take immediate
possession. Several courts have examined the issue and failed to find
such a grant of power. A public policy analysis leads to the conclu-
sion that conferring this power upon private corporations would have
the result of encouraging uncompensated takings of private property,
with little or no benefit in return. The inevitable conclusion on this
point seems to be that the Natural Gas Act does not and should not
grant certificate holders the power to take property without payment
or formal proceedings.
IAJ conclusion, it would appear that the Arnholt decision is fatally
flawed and should not be followed in a case presenting the same is-
sues. When one delves more deeply into the court's reasoning, one
discovers that the decision lacks true support. There is no real basis
for finding that the Natural Gas Act would preempt a state law tres-
27 See, e.g., USG Pipeline Co. v. 1.74 Acres in Marion County, Tenn., I F. Supp. 2d 816,
827 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) ("[The Court ORDERS the Clerk of Court to deposit all funds received
from USGP in these cases in an interest bearing account pending a determination of just com-
pensation."); Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 170, 173
(D.N.D. 1981) ("Mhe plaintiff will deposit with the Clerk monies equal to the plaintiff's esti-
mate of the amount of just compensation and an additional amount of money or a bond equal to
at least twice the plaintiffs estimate of just compensation .... When the Clerk has received the
deposits hereby ordered, the plaintiff may take immediate possession of the easements."). But
see Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. New England Power, C.T.L., 6 F. Supp. 2d 102, 106 (D.
Mass. 1998) (granting pipeline company's request for immediate possession without requiring
the payment of funds to the court or the property owner).
25
' See Humphries v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 (D. Kan.
1999). The Humphries court stated:
[R]equiring the pipeline builder to first seek the court's approval of the acquisition
of the property prior to entering is, on its face, more desirable than the self-help
remedy invoked by [Williams] in its taking of Humphries' property. This is par-
ticularly true in light of the fact that it is apparently well settled "that the district
court does have the equitable power to grant immediate entry and possession where
such relief is essential to the pipeline construction schedule." Consequently, there
was no reason that [Williams] could not have sought immediate possession of Hum-
phries' property in this court prior t9 intruding on his land. Requiring the pipeline
builder to first seek the landowner's approval, or if that cannot be achieved, to seek
the approval of the court, would also obviate the possibility of any physical con-
frontation with the landowner.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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pass claim against a storage operator, and there is likewise no basis
for finding that the Natural Gas Act conferred upon FERC certificate
holders the power to take property without formal proceedings or
payment. The Humphries opinion is a much more thoughtful and in-
depth opinion that is well supported by both the authorities and logic.
C. The Unauthorized Storage of Gas Should Constitute Trespass
Accepting the proposition that a state law trespass claim is not
preempted by the federal Natural Gas Act in this context, the next
question is whether the unauthorized storage of natural gas beneath a
property constitutes trespass. Although the answer to this question, as
a matter of state law, will vary depending on jurisdiction, some useful
observations may be made on such trespass claims in general.
First, courts have allowed actions for both underground trespass
and trespass committed by an instrumentality under the control of a
person.259 Not all of the authorities are unambiguous, however. Co-
lumbia, for instance, has argued that according to the Ohio Supreme
Court's holding in Chance v. BP Chemical, Inc.,260 an action for un-
derground trespass cannot be maintained unless the owner can show
261
some amount of actual interference with the use of the property.
Superficially, this argument would appear to have merit. The facts of
Chance did involve an alleged underground trespass, and the Ohio
Supreme Court did hold that the owners' action could not be main-
tained because they were unable to show actual interference with the
surface use of the property.262 Upon a careful reading of the case,
however, one discovers important distinctions indicating that the
holding of Chance may be a narrow one.
Foremost among these is the explicit distinction that the court it-
self made between Chance and underground natural gas storage
cases. Both parties in Chance cited oil and gas cases, includingunderground gas storage cases, 264 in support of their arguments. The
259 See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
m 77 Ohio St. 3d 17 (1996).
6' See id. at 27.
262 Also, the case does appear to hold unequivocally that an owner's right to the subsurface
of their property is not absolute, although it does not clearly define the extent of those limita-
tions. See idt at 26 ("[We do not accept appellants' assertion of absolute ownership of every-
thing below the surface of their properties. Just as a property owner must accept some limita-
tions on the ownership rights extending above the surface of the property, we find that there are
also limitations on property owners' subsurface rights.") This is not dispositive of the issue at
hand, though, because it does not hold that the property owner has no subsurface rights, only
that they are limited, and the limitation is not clearly defined other than with regard to the un-
usual circumstances of Chance. See id. at 27-29 (describing the facts of Chance).
263 See id. at 24.
2 See id.
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court responded in this manner:
We find that the situation before us is not analogous to those
present in the oil and gas cases, around which a special body
of law has arisen based on special circumstances not present
here.... For the same reason, we also reject appellants' ar-
gument that this court's opinion in [McCullough], which in-
volved the determination of compensation due for the appro-
priation of an underground gas storage easement, is relevant
to the resolution of this case.
65
The property owners had argued that they should not be required
to show actual damages because the law of trespass allows for pre-
sumed damages. 266 In rejecting this argument, the court once again
seemed to limit the holding of the case: "We do not accept appellants'
argument in this regard in the specific circumstances of this case, but
find that some type of physical damages or interference with use must
be shown in an indirect invasion situation such as this."267 Although
one could interpret this language to mean that the rule should apply in
all cases of indirect underground trespass, it seems much more likely
that the holding is more limited than that. This is especially true
given the peculiar facts of the case, which involved the deepwell in-
jection of hazardous liquid waste, 268 and the distinguishing language
throughout the opinion, epitomized by the language holding specifi-
cally that the situation "is not analogous to those present in the oil and
M5 i
21 See id. at 27.
2 Id. (emphases added).
m This "deepwell injection" waste disposal process involves injecting liquid waste, called
injectate, through a well and into the native brine that is found several thousand feet beneath the
earth's surface. A layer of non-porous rock creates a barrier between the injected waste and the
surface.
The lawsuit in Chance was a class action suit on behalf of local property owners who
claimed to be damaged by the operation of a deepwell injection process of BP Chemical, Inc.
By the time the case reached the Ohio Supreme Court, the primary issue to be resolved was the
property owners' trespass claim, which was based on the contention that the injectate had mi-
grated laterally from the injection site to the geological substratum beneath their properties.
Despite expert testimony, the plaintiffs had trouble in even establishing that the injectate had in
fact migrated to the area beneath their properties. The court found that "there were great diffi-
culties in appellants establishing, as a factual matter, that a property invasion had occurred," and
that "when all of the circumstances of this case are considered, appellants' evidence of trespass
was simply too speculative." Id. at 27-28.
Given the unusual fact pattern and the speculative nature of the claims, the court
seemed to go out of its way to distinguish this case from others. In addition to the distinguish-
ing remarks quoted in the text above, the court used similar distinguishing language in other
places throughout the opinion, including one of the final paragraphs'of the opinion. There, the
court stated, "[w]hen the nature of the alleged property invasion is considered in light of appel-
lants' apparent lack of specific and readily demonstrable concrete damage, this was a highly
unusual case." Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
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,,269gas cases. In sum, courts should not apply Chance to underground
gas storage cases.
There is, on the other hand, a powerful policy argument for al-
lowing a trespass action on the facts typically presented in unauthor-
ized underground gas storage cases. Simply put, subsurface rights
should be treated differently than air rights because the historical use
of subsurface property has been much more extensive and profitable
for property owners than the historical use of air rights. Traditionally,
property owners have had the right to profit from the potentially valu-
able resources beneath their properties, including caves, valuable
minerals such as gold or silver, and reserves of coal, oil, and gas. The
geological formation that is typically used for an underground natural
gas storage field is one that originally contained natural gas. There is
no question that the owner of a property situated over such reserves
has the right to profit from them. In fact, the right is alienable and is
frequently transferred by sale or lease.
Storage operators cannot plausibly argue that property owners
have no protectable property interest in the same geological formation
in which they did have a protectable and alienable interest when the
formation contained native natural gas.270 Such a reversal should re-
quire strong justification. While it is true that underground natural
gas storage serves an important public interest, that alone would not
provide sufficient justification, for the Constitution forbids the taking
of property for the public interest without the payment of just com-
pensation.271 It would likewise not be sufficient to argue that the
owner's property interest was in the gas itself, rather than the rock,
and that, since the gas is gone, the owner's interest is extinguished.
Even in Chance, which limited Ohio property owners' subsurface
rights to at least some degree, the court only held that such rights
were limited, not that they were non-existent.272
There is reason, then, to treat subsurface rights differently from
air rights because of the traditional ability of owners to profit from
valuable resources beneath their land. It is arguable that the facts of
Chance are more analogous to an air rights case than an underground
gas storage case. The plume of injectate from the deepwell injection
29 Id. at 24.
270 But see Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment at 11, Amend, No. 1:98CV590 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (settled before disposition) ("Columbia
seeks dismissal of the trespass counterclaim because the [Amends] have no protectable property
interest in the depleted Clinton Formation 3,000 feet beneath the 'subject tract' where Columbia
stores its gas.").
271 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
272 See Chance, 77 Ohio St. 3d at 25 ("Appellants have a property interest in the rock into
which the injectate is placed, albeit a potentially limited one .... ).
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process dispersing through the geological substratum in Chance
seems analogous to a plume of smoke dispersing in the air from a
smokestack. This is fundamentally different from a storage operator
knowingly profiting from the use of an underground gas storage fa-
cility beneath an owner's property without first acquiring the right to
do so. Given these considerations, it is not difficult to come to the
conclusion that a storage operator that knowingly uses property-
even subsurface property-without paying for the right to do so
should be liable for trespass.
CONCLUSIONS
This Note has examined the issues of valuation methodology,
preemption of state law trespass claims, and whether or not the un-
authorized storage of natural gas constitutes trespass. It is time now
to summarize the results of that examination and come to some con-
clusions. First, to some preliminary sub-issues: the problem of puni-
tive damages and the question of who should pay any increased costs.
A. Punitive Damages
One of the problems to be resolved when dealing with these is-
sues is the question of whether punitive damages should be allowed.
On the one hand, underground natural gas storage serves an enor-
mously important public interest. Out-of-control punitive damage
awards could harm that interest if the awards are large enough to seri-
ously weaken the companies that provide the service and to render
them less able to perform their role in the national natural gas deliv-
ery infrastructure. Also, as noted before, the rights at issue here have
a relatively low value on an individual basis, so large punitive dam-
age awards would seem unjustified.
On the other hand, a decision not to allow punitive damages in
the type of case at issue here would have the effect of encouraging
storage operators to continue taking property without the payment of
just compensation. The fact that the property subject to the "willful
unauthorized expropriation" 273 is low in value is not dispositive of the
issue.274 The situation seems to cry out for an undesirable economic
consequence accompanying non-compliance with the condemnation
273 Bowman v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 1988 WL 68890, at *3 (6th Cir. July 6,
1988).
274 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982)
(explaining that when the nature of the action by the government "is a permanent physical occu-
pation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation,
without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal
economic impact on the owner").
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procedures set forth in the Natural Gas Act. Such a result would
change the decision-making calculus of storage operators and make
compliance with the Act's provisions the rule rather than the excep-
tion.
Hence, the arguments for punitive damages weigh more heavily
in favor of allowing punitive damages than against. Some potential
solutions, moreover, could keep these punitive damage awards within
reason at the same time as providing a greater incentive for compli-
ance. Condemnations do not have to be performed one at a time, for
instance. A storage operator could file an action to condemn all the
remaining window properties over a given storage field and request
the appointment of a commission to determine the appropriate com-
pensation for all those properties at the same time. With a single de-
termination of punitive damages by an appointed commission, rather
than a piecemeal determination by multiple juries, it is more likely
that the total punitive damage award would reasonably reflect the de-
gree of corporate wrongdoing. The best solution to this issue, how-
ever, may be statutory, as will be discussed shortly.
B. Who Should Pay?
The question of how any increased costs should be distributed
must be considered in any resolution of these problems. Any solution
that results in greater numbers of condemnations of window proper-
ties will result in higher costs to consumers, because the costs of these
properties are capital costs that the storage operator is permitted to
pass through to the consumer.
The actual cost of compensating owners of condemned property
rights is a legitimate cost of doing business that storage companies
should be permitted to pass on to consumers. Although the condem-
nation of window properties would therefore result in somewhat
higher costs to the consumer, the difference should be negligible on
an individual basis and is easily justified. First, costs will only go up
because the property that is being condemned should have been con-
demned a long time ago. The problem is not that the new costs will
be too high, but rather that old costs were artificially low because the
storage operators (and ultimately consumers) were essentially re-
ceiving a "free ride" at the expense of some individual property own-
ers. Second, the purpose of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is to protect private property owners from having to bear a dis-
proportionate share of the burden of providing for the public good.275
275 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
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Thus, these increased costs should be spread among consumers.
Punitive damages, however, are a different story. They arise
from the misconduct of companies that were entrusted with an enor-
mous public power-the power to take property for public use against
the wishes of the property owner. It would seem that there are two
strong arguments for not allowing the gas companies to pass along the
costs of punitive damages to the consumers. First, it seems unjust to
the consumer. The arguments enumerated above for sharing the costs
of condemning private property for public use do not apply here. The
public gets nothing in return for the payment of punitive damages as
they do from the condemnation of property for public facilities, and
they played no role in the conduct that gave rise to the punitive dam-
ages. Second, permitting the gas companies to pass along the costs of
punitive damages to the consumers eviscerates the primary justifica-
tion for awarding the punitive damages in the first place, deterrence.
What deterrent value will there be in punitive damages that are simply
passed along to the consumer? The only result would be a windfall to
the property owner and increased costs to consumers. The gas com-
panies would have no motivation to change their behavior in the fu-
ture. Care should be taken to see that punitive damages are borne by
the company and its shareholders, rather than the public. As whole-
sale interstate gas prices are federally regulated, responsibility for this
would fall to FERC, as well as to the legislators crafting a statute to
address these issues.
C. A Statutory Solution?
Perhaps the best resolution to all of the issues addressed in this
note would be an amendment to the Natural Gas Act authoritatively
resolving these questions and setting forth uniform rules to be ap-
plied. There would be several possible approaches to such an
amendment.
First, with regard to the preemption issue, the statute could take
one of two approaches. One would be to simply make explicit that if
the certificate holders fail to follow the procedures mandated by the
statute, the statute does not preempt state trespass laws. The certain
knowledge that the storage operator would be left to the vagaries of
individual juries with the authority to award punitive damages should
be enough to encourage future compliance.
One thing this approach would not do, however, is provide the
storage operator with protection from devastating punitive damage
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
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awards for past conduct. Although one can make the case that the
conduct involved is reprehensible, there is a danger that punitive
damage awards could be excessive relative to the degree of wrong-
doing involved. One of the opportunities that a statutory solution
would provide would be the ability to balance these equities and ar-
rive at a fair solution to the problem that would be henceforth uni-
formly applied.
An appropriate solution might be a provision that specifically
does preempt state law. The provision should require that when con-
demnation procedures are not followed, the owners must be compen-
sated with interest from the time that the property was first used by
the certificate holder, and must be reimbursed for any attorney's fees
and court costs incurred, along with a further provision that provides
for a fine to be paid to the government by the certificate holder. This
solution would provide for deterrent measures while allowing the
legislators to set the fine at a level commensurate with the severity of
the violation.
Detailed economic analysis would most likely be necessary to
arrive at the proper fine structure, but certainly it could be accom-
plished in a number of ways. A fine based on a percentage of value
of the property taken improperly would be one example, as would a
simple flat amount per violation. The goal would be to set the
amount at such a level as to have deterrent value without being exces-
sive relative to the seriousness of the violation. If it is significantly
cheaper to comply with the Natural Gas Act than not to comply, it
seems reasonable to predict that compliance will be the rule.
A statutory solution could also tackle the valuation methodology
problem, but in this case less might be more. There might be value in
making explicit that the substantive law of the state should be fol-
lowed in determining value. The Sixth Circuit makes a convincing
argument in the McCullough case that this is an area best left to the
states for a variety of reasons. 276 Property rights are such a traditional
area of state control that there is little reason to replace state law with
federal law at this point. The statute could enumerate the McCul-
lough factors and dictate that they be followed in federal condemna-
tions for underground storage rights. But this seems unnecessary.
The history of the Natural Gas Act has been to leave intact as much as
possible the states' jurisdiction over matters within their traditional
regulatory sphere, and clearly that would include the valuation of
property. The progress of the McCullough case, culminating in a very
workable formula for determining the value of an underground gas
276 See McCullough, 962 F.2d 1192, 1195-99 (6th Cir. 1992).
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storage easement, suggests that this can be successfully worked out
on a state-by-state basis.
A properly constructed statutory solution, then, would provide
several benefits. It would insure that property owners are made
whole when violations occur, provide a deterrent to prevent future
violations, cap punitive measures at a reasonable level, and provide a
nationally uniform solution. At the same time, the states' interests
would be addressed by permitting each state to establish their own
valuation methodology, and by providing the statutory incentives that
would improve compliance with proper condemnation procedures,
thus making it less likely that storage operators would run afoul of
state trespass laws. Provisions that require reparations to the land-
owner in the event of a violation would likewise insure that the feder-
ally regulated storage operator would not be able to use the federal
statute to ride rough-shod over the landowner's state property rights.
Relying on the courts for a solution to these problems seems less
likely to produce correct and uniform results. As the foregoing analy-
sis section demonstrates, it is possible to resolve these issues in the
courts without resorting to the crafting of new legislation. It does not
seem realistic, though, to believe that each state and circuit will re-
solve the issues either properly or uniformly. This is shown by the
Arnholt decision,277 which is arguably an incorrect, unsupported deci-
sion in which that court failed even to follow its own precedent, and
the Humphries opinion,278 which is arguably correct and well sup-
ported, but reaches a different result than Arnholt on similar facts.
Also, although the argument for punitive damages is strong, the
problem of capping punitive damages at a reasonable level seems
particularly intractable when relying on individual juries to establish
amounts. Statutory punitive damages would solve this problem.
Based on the foregoing considerations, it seems that an amend-
ment to the Natural Gas Act would provide the best overall solution
to the problems addressed in this Note. The most desirable approach
is one that would explicitly preempt state trespass law in the case of
violations and provide for reparations to be made to the owner, as
well as fines to be paid to the government. The amendment should
also provide specifically that state substantive law should be followed
in determining value in condemnation actions.
27 See Arnholt, 747 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
278 48 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (D. Kan. 1999).
2" See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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D. The Current State of the Law
For now there is no statutory solution available to the punitive
damage problems or to any of the other issues discussed in this Note.
What then, is the current state of the law?
As far as valuation methodology is concerned, the answer varies
depending on jurisdiction. In Ohio, for instance, the law is fairly
clear. The Sixth Circuit has ruled that state law must be looked to in
establishing value, and the Ohio Supreme Court has clearly promul-
gated the method for doing so. Elsewhere in the Sixth Circuit, in
Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee, it is clear that state law must be
looked to, but perhaps less clear what that law actually is. And in the
rest of the country, the question is unresolved at both the state and
federal level. The Sixth Circuit and Ohio Supreme Court opinions in
McCullough, however, provide useful precedents that are worthy of
consideration by other courts.
As to the issue of whether state law trespass claims should be
allowed when storage operators do not follow the procedure for ac-
quiring property rights provided for in the Natural Gas Act, the argu-
ments and the weight of the authorities all point in the direction of
allowing the trespass claims. Although this determination exposes
the storage operators to liability for punitive damages, the arguments
for permitting punitive damages in such cases are stronger than those
against. Storage operators are free to pursue damages-limiting strate-
gies, such as lobbying for a statutory solution or mass condemnations
with the appointment of a commission. The bottom line is that stor-
age operators have been entrusted with an enormous public responsi-
bility, and if they refuse to follow the procedures for acquiring prop-
erty as laid out in the Natural Gas Act, they should expect negative
economic consequences to flow from that conduct.
On the issue of preemption, there is no basis for finding that a
state trespass claim is preempted by the Natural Gas Act, because it
does not conflict with the federal law, does not frustrate congressional
objectives, and the state does not have an improper purpose in prom-
ulgating trespass law. Nor is there a solid foundation upon which to
determine that the Natural Gas Act vests in the storage operators the
power to take property without payment or formal proceedings, leav-
ing the owner with only an inverse condemnation claim. And while
there may be some question as to the extent of property owners' sub-
surface rights, it would appear that those rights are at least extensive
enough to permit a trespass claim when a storage operator is profiting
from the geological formations beneath an owner's property without
first having obtained the right to do so. It is clear, then, that trespass
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claims should be allowed.
A statutory solution would provide two important features not
provided by the current state of the law-a nationally uniform solu-
tion, and a reasonable cap on punitive damages. Even without a
statutory solution, however, following the recommendations in this
Note would provide many benefits. States would be able to deter-
mine their own methods of property valuation, with the guidance of
the already formulated McCullough factors to assist in their delibera-
tions. Storage operators would be motivated to comply with the re-
quirements of the Natural Gas Act. Property owners victimized by
past violations of the Act would be made whole, and perhaps most
importantly, property owners from this point forward would be com-
pensated in a timely manner for the taking of their property, in accord
with constitutional dictates.
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